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Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-94-160 *18 August 1994*

CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form. An Ω indicates a Foreign Media Note.

ALBANIA

Foreign Ministry Protests 'Absurd' Greek Policy *[Tirana TV]* 1
Greek Nationals Protest Outside Tirana Court *[Tirana TV]* 1
Greek Minority Trial Continues *[Tirana TV]* 1

BULGARIA

Justice Minister Cited on Role of Supreme Court *[Sofia Radio]* 3
Dimitrov, Drenchev Discuss Non-Communist Unity *[Sofia Radio]* 3
Nuclear Plant Chief Warns of Possible Power Cuts *[TRUD 12 Aug]* 3

SLOVAKIA

Moravcik Interviewed Before Trip to Poland *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 18 Aug]* 4
Kanis Discusses Defense Ministry Reorganization *[Bratislava Radio]* 4
Staff To Be Reduced *[Bratislava Radio]* 5
Truth Party Elects Jozef Durka New Chairman *[SLOVENSKY DENNIK 12 Aug]* 5

HUNGARY

Keleti: NATO AWACS Flights Supported *[Budapest Radio]* 6
Carlos Inquiry Dropped for 'Insufficient Evidence' *[London THE TIMES 17 Aug]* 6
Information Withholding Denied *[Budapest TV]* 6
Witness on Carlos Visits *[Budapest TV]* 6
Intelligence Chief Views Tasks, Crime Situation *[NEPSZABADSAG 13 Aug]* 7
Security Chief Cited Further on Tasks, Problems *[NEPSZABADSAG 18 Jul]* 8
Reorganization of Industry, Trade Ministry *[NEPSZABADSAG 7 Jul]* 9
New Government Oath Seen Violating Tradition *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 20 Jul]* 9
Article Views Effect of Chains on Small Stores *[NEPSZABADSAG 4 Jul]* 9

POLAND

Zacharski Resigns as Head of Intelligence *[PAP]* 11
Walesa Opposes Intelligence Chief's Appointment *[PAP]* 11
Stand Called 'Game' *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 18 Aug]* 11
Daily Reports Further on Zacharski Case *[TRYBUNA 18 Aug]* 11
Zacharski, Kuklinski, U.S., Soviet Role Viewed *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 18 Aug]* 12
TV Says Deputy Head of Intelligence To Resign *[Warsaw TV]* 13
Slovak Prime Minister Arrives on One-Day Visit *[PAP]* 14
Ukrainian, Belarusian Policy Changes Foreseen *[POLITYKA 23 Jul]* 14
Daily Details Present Budget Situation *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 17 Aug]* 16

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Mladic Called to Belgrade to Discuss Arms *[Sarajevo Radio]* 18
Article: Mladic 'Key Man' in Serbian Dispute *[BORBA 17 Aug]* 18
Krajisnik Cited *[BORBA 17 Aug]* 18
Sarajevo Sets Deadline for Abdic's Surrender *[AFP]* 19
HVO Commander Denies Abdic's Claims *[Sarajevo Radio]* 19
UN: Army Consolidates Positions Around Vares *[AFP]* 19

Government, Serbs Exchange 27 Prisoners of War *[AFP]* 20
Serbs Deny Blocking UN Aid Convoys *[TANJUG]* 20
Obstacles to Evacuation of Serbs Overcome *[TANJUG]* 20
'Terror' Against Banja Luka Muslims Reported *[Sarajevo Radio]* 20
Lack of Security Postpones Croat-Muslim Talks *[Zagreb Radio]* 21
Serb General in Bosnian Army Interviewed *[SRPSKA REC 1 Aug]* 21

CROATIA

Refugee Association Ends Blockade of UN Troops *[TANJUG]* 24
Bosnian Serbs Fire 2 Shells at Dubrovnik Airport *[Zagreb Radio]* 24
Inconsistencies of UN Mandate Viewed *[DANAS 26 Jul]* 24
Successes of Croatian Air Defense Viewed *[HRVATSKI VOJNIK 28 Jan]* 25

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Deputy Prime Minister Meets EU Mission Chief *[TANJUG]* 27
Ministry Concern for Russian Rights in Baltic *[TANJUG]* 27

Serbia

SPO Wants Blockade of Bosnian Serbs Lifted *[BORBA 17 Aug]* 27
Radical Party Leader on Assembly Incident *[NIN 29 Jul]* 28

Foreign Ministry Protests 'Absurd' Greek Policy

AU1708172894 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Statement issued by unidentified Foreign Ministry spokesman in Tirana on 16 August—read by announcer]

[Text] Regarding the undeniable statement by Greek Foreign Minister Mr. Karolios Papoulias, as reported in the Greek media, that Albania testifies to having lost its cool and that Tirana should understand that the limits have been surpassed, we have been authorized to issue the following explanation:

The Albanian Government has always aimed at normalizing and strengthening relations between Albania and Greece, even though the Greek authorities continue to pursue an absurd and provocative policy against the Albanian State. No independent and democratic state can allow interference in its internal affairs, either by public statements or concrete actions such as the deliberate provocation of 15 August in front of the Tirana Court by Greek citizens, journalists, and Greek justice representatives—lawyers and attorneys—who should have been the first to maintain law and order and express the democratic values of the country from which they come.

The official Greek authorities have allowed Greek citizens to make populist and provocative demonstrations in front of the Albanian Embassy in Athens. With such provocative demonstrations, these populist militants cannot exert pressure and prevent the trial from running its normal course. Malicious versions of the truth about the policy of the Albanian Government, the character of the trial, and the provocative demonstration by Greek nationals, who were claimed by Greek officials and the media to be from the ethnic Greek minority, are designed to misinform the public and exert pressure on the Albanian justice, and they will fail.

As to who has lost his orientation and cool is clearly seen in the threatening statements issued by top Greek officials, at a time when the Albanian Government has opened up to dialogue. The language of threats, blackmail, and blockade that the Greek Government is using against its neighbors is useless, destabilizing, and unacceptable.

Greek Nationals Protest Outside Tirana Court

AU1708172794 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Text] As you have been informed, the trial of defendants Theodhori Bezhani, Vangjel Papakristo, Kosta Qirjako, Irakli Sirma, and Panajot Marto opened in Tirana yesterday. Evident at the trial was a kind of nervousness manifested by Greek citizens who included lawyers, attorneys, and Greek media journalists. This even reached the point of arrogance and open provocation. In an apparently premeditated scenario, a group of 10 to 15 Greek nationals gathered in front of the Tirana Court building yesterday. They organized a pseudo-meeting and shouted slogans such as: Freedom for the six minority persons; Freedom of thought; We want religious rights; etc.

The slogans shouted created the impression that the participants in this pseudo-meeting and its organizers were far from being of this world and had come from another planet. They are demanding religious freedom, when this is permitted in Albania. These Greek citizens are demanding freedom of speech at a time when everything in Albania has been developing in conformity with the laws of the democratic Albanian State and according to known international norms and standards.

The speeches held at this rally and the speed with which the Greek television networks filmed it show that it is a question of a deliberate act aimed at exerting pressure on an open trial.

Furthermore, it should be stated that, by abusing the right to move freely around Albania, these Greek citizens have carried out provocations against the Albanian police authorities. Their aim is to prevent the trial from proceeding normally.

These Greek citizens and their organizers are thus continuing their series of anti-Albanian backstage provocations and pressures. Yells from unbalanced people arriving from Athens reveal a dubious position and a guilty demeanor on the part of those currently facing Albanian justice.

No one in Albania is frightened by demonstrators arriving from beyond the state borders. The demonstration became more provocative and intolerable when the furious Greeks became involved in clashes with Albanian policemen doing their duty. It is high time that all those who caused these incidents were punished in conformity with the laws of the Albanian state.

The demonstration organized by the 10-15 Greek nationals in front of the Tirana Court is a provocation with malice and forethought. No pressure can be exerted through such tricks against the independent Albanian justice authorities. No one is stopping the Greek nationals and their organizers from organizing such a circus in Athens, Ioannina, or Salonika. They have been doing such things for a long time.

Greek Minority Trial Continues

AU1708194894 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Report by Timo Luto]

[Text] The trial of defendants Theodhori Bezhani, Vangjel Papakristo, Irakli Sirma, Kosta Qirjako, and Panajot Marto resumed at the Tirana Court today.

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Court Chairman Martin Deda opened the proceedings with matters of legal procedure. After listening to Prosecutor Genc Gjokutaj and the defense counsels, he decided to start the trial by questioning the defendants.

Defendant Vangjel Papakristo was the first to take the floor. He stressed that he did not accept the charge against him. Court Chairman Deda told the defendant that he had the right to say what he would about the charge and plead guilty or innocent as he wished.

Then Prosecutor Genc Gjokutaj started the cross-examination. His line of questioning aimed at proving the charge that there had been relations or cooperation between Papakristo and Greek security service officials. Defendant Vangjel Papakristo admitted that he had met the people named in the indictment and had met them together with Sotir Qirjazati. Regarding his repeated meetings with Andrea Zarbakulla, the chief of the Greek Asphali [not further identified] in Ioannina, defendant Papakristo confirmed that he had met him on three or four occasions.

Asked by Court Chairman Martin Deda how he could explain that every time he visited the Hotel Palladio, Asphalia chief Zarbakulla was there, Papakristo declined to answer. He also declined to answer a question by Gjokutaj about what he knew about Asphalia and its aims.

Mr. Gjokutaj submitted evidence of further meetings of the defendant Papakristo with other members of the Greek secret service. He asked why Asphalia and its chief in Ioannina, Andrea Zarbakulla, had often displayed a great interest in Omonia, its members, its presidency, its branches, and its policies.

Continuing to cross-examine Papakristo, Prosecutor Gjokutaj presented evidence of a number of payments that the Greek State, institutes, and churches have granted to the Omonia organization. Papakristo confirmed to the court that a bank account containing 60 million Greek drachmas was opened in Athens by Omonia under the name of Sotir Qirjazati and that the funds granted to Omonia came from institutes in Athens, Ioannina, and elsewhere. Papakristo also confirmed that he had received thousands of drachmas, and that another million had been donated by Sotir Qirjazati for electoral propaganda.

During the hearing, Prosecutor Gjokutaj complained about the deliberate provocations by one of the Greek deputies, who was interfering with the normal course of the trial. He reminded Papakristo and the court that claims that regulations and known norms have been violated run counter to the fact that the CSCE high commissioner, after meeting the defendants, made no statement supporting such claims. For this reason, Gjokutaj pointed out that these insinuations are the result of propaganda put about by people whom the defendants have been serving for a long time.

The trial then continued with defendant Theodhori Bezhani taking the floor. From the outset, he attempted to avoid the evidence in the indictment. At one stage he cited the Corfu Protocol as a pretext for organizing a rally in Delvinaq, thus intentionally distorting the fact that the Corfu Protocol is not an interstate treaty.

After this, Prosecutor Arben Qeleshi opened his cross-examination. But this was quickly interrupted with defendant Panajot Marto requesting medical assistance through his defense counsel.

Court Chairman Deda then called for a recess in order to obtain medical assistance for Marto. The trial is to resume at 0900 [0700 GMT] tomorrow.

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Justice Minister Cited on Role of Supreme Court

AU1708174494 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Text] In an interview with Khorizont Radio, Justice Minister Petur Kornazhev declared that, as long as there is no Supreme Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court cannot refuse to be at the citizens' service in legal matters. The Supreme Court judges are obliged to further perform their duties on the basis of a specific text contained in the Law on the Judiciary.

The minister intends to spend another few days reflecting over Mrs. Nora Ananieva's insistent request that the minister should propose to the president to relieve Chief Prosecutor Ivan Tatarchev and Supreme Court Chairman Ivan Grigorov from their posts.

Minister Petur Kornazhev also pointed out that the government is expected to examine measures against illegal business activities tomorrow.

Dimitrov, Drenchev Discuss Non-Communist Unity

AU1708185494 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Text] Filip Dimitrov, leader of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], and Milan Drenchev, leader of the Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS], met today in order to discuss the political situation in the country and the necessity of consolidating all the non-communist forces in possible early elections.

There was no question of forming an electoral coalition between the two forces during the meeting, the Agrarian leader pointed out. Nevertheless, he did not exclude the possibility for him of rejoining the SDS and declared that he has always shared the union's ideas.

Nuclear Plant Chief Warns of Possible Power Cuts

AU1808110394 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 12 Aug 94 p 1

[Text] The country will possibly return to a schedule of power cuts, with two hours on and one hour off, unless the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant receives at least 300 million leva for planned maintenance of the Nos. 3, 4, and 5 reactor units. Kozma Kuzmanov, the plant's chief, informed TRUD that work on preparing the plant for the winter season is already delayed overall by more than a month.

Kiril Tsochev, deputy prime minister for economic matters, has refused to take measures to finance the summer repair work at the Kozloduy plant. He did this at a meeting with representatives of the plant's operating staff on 10 August. The position of the executive was that only the National Electricity Company is responsible for collecting the unpaid electricity bills.

The large state enterprises owe almost 4 billion leva to the National Electricity Company, highly placed energy chiefs explained, and the company does not have the 453 million leva needed for repair work at Kozloduy. However, when the National Electricity Company tries to suspend supplying current to a big industrial debtor, ministers and parliamentary deputies intervene to stop the switch being pulled.

Lawyers in the sector commented that the government only has to issue an ordinary decree to compel the enterprises to pay their electricity bills first, and then everything else.

The management of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant has sufficient courage to refuse to commission reactor units that do not conform to the radiation and nuclear safety standards, Kozma Kuzmanov declared on 12 July. Yesterday he told TRUD that there has been no change in the plant's financial situation since then. Spare parts valued at $1 million have been withheld by the customs authorities in Lom because the Finance Ministry wants 6 million leva in value-added tax to be paid on them.

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Moravcik Interviewed Before Trip to Poland

WS1808110994 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 18 Aug 94 pp 1, 25

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Josef Moravcik by Andrzej Niewiadowski; place and date not given: "Slovakia Is Following the Polish Path"]

[Text] [Niewiadowski] What is the purpose of your visit to Poland?

[Moravcik] It is the first official visit by the prime minister of Slovakia since the establishment of our state in January 1992. Its purpose is, first of all, to give a new impetus to Slovak-Polish relations, to evaluate the cooperation we have conducted so far, as well as the possibilities for intensifying it. What I mean is not only economic cooperation, which leaves a lot to be desired, but also cooperation in the areas of science and education.

[Niewiadowski] Are any specific agreements going to be signed?

[Moravcik] Yes, they are. Among others, we will sign an agreement on investment protection and on avoiding double taxation. It will constitute the legal framework for our cooperation. So far, a lot has been said about it; however, it was often the case that words were not followed by deeds.

[Niewiadowski] Does this mean that there will be greater chances of creating the Tatra Region?

[Moravcik] I think the chances are very good. During my visit to Poland, I will sign an agreement on cross-border cooperation, which will multiply those chances.

[Niewiadowski] Still, it will not be possible to initial many agreements that are equally important, such as those in the areas of culture or education...

[Moravcik] In the area of culture, the agreement concluded in 1991 between Poland and Czechoslovakia is still binding. Work on an agreement on cooperation in the area of education is in the preparatory stages. Chances are that it will be signed as early as this year.

[Niewiadowski] What is your evaluation of the present relations with our country, as compared to Slovakia's relations with other partners of the Visegrad Group?

[Moravcik] They are good. Slovakia's contacts with each of its neighbors are unique. In our dialogue with Hungary, we have several open questions we discuss all the time. Our relations with the Czech Republic are privileged: Since 1918, with the exception of a short period during World War II, we have been linked to each other by a common history. In this sense, our economic ties to the Czech Republic are above-standard because we have formed the Tariff Union.

[Niewiadowski] Are you in favor of maintaining cooperation within the Visegrad Group?

[Moravcik] Yes, I am. We should, in particular, develop economic cooperation. I am now thinking about the implementation of the decisions made by the Central European Free Trade Agreement, the striving to establish custom-free trade zones. Even if cooperation within the Group is not institutionalized, I believe we are linked by many common issues, such as the issue of security or politics.

[Niewiadowski] In 45 days, early parliamentary elections are to be held in Slovakia. What does the present situation on the internal political scene look like?

[Moravcik] Slovakia is following the path that has been chosen by Poland, Hungary, and other postcommunist countries. A new configuration of forces is being established. Our political scene is still split into many small factions; however, the forthcoming elections will be a considerable step forward in the process of uniting political parties. The Slovak left wing is uniting; there is a chance that the right wing will hold a dialogue.

[Niewiadowski] What will happen in October?

[Moravcik] It is quite likely that the election will not change the structure of parliament. This may mean that we will have problems similar to those we are facing now. The most important thing is to form a stable, majority government that would steer Slovakia for the next four years.

[Niewiadowski] What do you think was the greatest success of the present coalition, and what was its biggest mistake?

[Moravcik] I think that, among our successes, I might include the fact that we managed to calm the internal political scene and obtain foreign support. We stabilized the economic situation; we did not greatly increase the budget deficit, unemployment, or inflation. We had, however, too little time to put all of our plans into effect, and that was our mistake...

[Niewiadowski] How do you evaluate Western aid to Slovakia? Do you think it was sufficient to sustain the process of democratic reforms in your country?

[Moravcik] We greatly appreciate Western aid, especially in the economy. We have obtained a loan from the IMF. We are glad that the process of ratification of the association agreement with the European Union is going on according to plans.

Kanis Discusses Defense Ministry Reorganization

LD1708152394 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Text] The changes brought about by the reorganization of the Defense Ministry of the Slovak Republic and the creation of a general staff based in Trencin—these were the two main points on the agenda of the news briefing at the Defense Ministry today. My colleague Miroslav Minar has further details.

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[Minar] The changes that have been under way in the Defense Ministry and in the present Slovak Army command in Trencin since June are part of a process that is a follow-up of the basic development concept for the Army presented as long ago as last year. In no case can there be a mention of some last minute action, agreed both speakers at today's news briefing—Defense Minister Pavel Kanis and his adviser Colonel General Jozef Tuchyna, who is also in charge of setting up a general staff in Trencin.

The fact that the extensive reorganization changes are taking place precisely at this moment ensues also from the policy statement of the coalition government that stipulated that it would be more forceful in pushing for the transformation of the Army. This is what Kanis said about the reasons for reorganizing the Defense Ministry and the Slovak Army command.

[Begin Kanis recording] The Slovak Ministry of Defense, as the new central state administration body of the Slovak Republic, and the Army command were set up at the time the Slovak Republic came into being. But the Army command was set up on the basis of the former Military Command East, while the ministry itself was set up in an ad hoc fashion. Experience from the organization and the system of work of the Federal Ministry of Defense was adopted in creating the organizational structure of these two bodies.

This process underestimated one important fact, however, which was that the structure of the Federal Ministry of Defense included the General Staff. This fact made it possible for the Federal Ministry of Defense to carry out the tasks of both the central body of state administration and the supreme body of military command.

The key feature of this underestimation that occurred in Slovakia was first and foremost the inconsistent understanding of all of the connections and consequences of carrying out the decision to create the Slovak Army command in Trencin, which was supposed to have been an operational command body. It therefore was not a general staff possessing the relevant, powers that a supreme command body should have.

The aforementioned decision was also negatively reflected in the ministry's organizational structure, where the basic element, the capability to implement strategic tasks in the sphere of military and defense policy, was missing.

The structure of the Department of Development and Economy, which was created, was not adapted to this purpose. Consequently, the Defense Ministry was unable to implement in full the function of the central body of state administration for the purpose of securing the defense of the Slovak Republic. Ever since the ministry was set up, its work has been plagued by negative phenomena. These included, for example: inconsistency in identifying itself with the military and political content of the work of the ministry [as heard], efforts aimed at gaining a greater share in the direct command of individual sections of the army—if one were to simplify things, one could say that the Defense Ministry was in effect turning itself into some kind of a shadow command of the Army—and, last, underestimation of the necessity of pursuing certain partnership relations vis-a-vis the Slovak Army command, relations that would be different from those of a strict subordination to orders. The causes of these facts are in part subjective.

If it is a general who heads the ministry, the ministry's objectives are formulated in a way that makes it possible for the ministry to be able to function also as a body of command. In other words, its effort is aimed at substituting the command of the Slovak Army. As a result, there is an undesirable duplicity of work.

On the contrary, a minister, who represents a political party, cannot and does not even have to pursue functions of this kind. Here, then, we have arrived at one of the basic principles governing the development of the army of a democratic state, which in advanced democracies does not permit a soldier to hold the post of defense minister. [end recording]

Staff To Be Reduced

LD1708153594 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1300 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Text] On 1 September, new organizational structures will come into force at the Defense Ministry and at the Army headquarters. The latter will be transformed into a general staff.

Defense Minister Pavol Kanis has given a briefing in Bratislava about the need to implement these changes and about some specific measures. A number of people at the managerial level will be reduced, bringing about a yearly estimated savings of 3.6 million korunas in salaries.

Colonel General Jozef Tuchyna, adviser to the defense minister, said that this reduction is taking place in harmony with the 1992 Vienna agreement on reducing numbers in armed forces, according to which the Slovak Army would not have more than 46,667 members at the end of next year.

Truth Party Elects Jozef Durka New Chairman

AU1708145894 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 12 Aug 94 p 2

[Unattributed report in the "Briefs" column]

[Text] At an extraordinary meeting on 10 August, the Preparatory Committee of the Party of Truth [Strana Pravdy] (SP), which was registered with the Slovak Ministry of Interior on 4 August 1994, deprived hitherto SP Chairman Pavol Dunak of his post by a two-thirds' majority and expelled him from the party's ranks, Alexander Jaray, member of the SP Preparatory Committee and author of the party's philosophy, told the TA SR yesterday. He said that Jozef Durka was elected the new SP chairman.

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Keleti: NATO AWACS Flights Supported

LD1708135494 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1300 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Text] According to Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti, Hungary would like to define in a document the conditions for reconnaissance flights in its airspace. The defense minister also told NATO's supreme allied commander in Europe, that the Hungarian leadership continues to support patrols by NATO AWACS aircraft, the aim of which is to monitor the no-fly zone over Bosnia.

In his Budapest talks, General Joulwan said he considers the Army's control by civilians to be important, but that civilians must ensure the conditions for the Army's operations.

Carlos Inquiry Dropped for 'Insufficient Evidence'

LD1708193994 London THE TIMES in English 17 Aug 94 p 2

[Text] Hungary, which once sheltered Carlos and has rare television pictures of him, has dropped an investigation into him because of insufficient evidence.

The inquiry into links between Carlos and the country's former Communist leaders was ordered in 1991 after the revelation that Hungary had sheltered the world's most wanted guerrilla in the late 1970s and early 1980s, lavishing favours on him and supplying him with whisky and women.

Janos Fabian, deputy prosecutor, said: "The procedure was suspended because we did not have a perpetrator—we did not have Carlos. We could not proceed with the investigation because we did not have evidence."

Fabian said that Hungary was not seeking Carlos because neither he nor his terrorist group had committed crimes in Hungary or against Hungarians. "We don't have a list of his sins because he and his companions came to Hungary mostly for holidays."

Andras Petresevics, formerly responsible for anti-terrorist activity, told Hungarian Television in 1990 that Carlos lived like a "man of the world" in Budapest, enjoying luxury hotels, women and the finest whisky. The same year, Hungarian newspapers published a letter from Carlos, thanking the country's late Communist leader, Janos Kadar, for offering him a safe haven.

Four years ago, Hungarian television showed a secretly made film shot about ten years earlier on talks between Hungarian secret service officials and Carlos.

The grainy film appeared to show two Hungarian counter-espionage officials telling Carlos that the guerrilla group could no longer base its operations in Hungary but transit visits and short stays would still be allowed.

Carlos, dressed in a suit, demanded information from the Hungarians about East European secret service reports on terrorist activity in West Germany.

Also in 1990, Miklos Redei, former head of Hungary's counter-espionage service, said Carlos and his group were never invited to Hungary but the authorities did not dare to arrest or kill him.

Mr Redei said: "We knew that if something happened to Carlos here the whole terrorist group would have declared Allah's revenge on Hungary. All our embassies abroad would have been exposed to their revenge."

Information Withholding Denied

LD1708194694 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Excerpts] Hungarian Deputy Prosecutor Janos Fabian has denied the report by the Budapest correspondent of THE TIMES that the most important items of information in the Carlos affair were withheld in Hungary. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified correspondent] The Hungarian authorities had handed over to the French every bit of information that could be handed over in the Carlos affair, we learned from an official source. The French, however, have not received Hungarian state secrets or information which would harm the national interests, just as they would not have received information of this kind from any other country.

[Begin recording] [Fabian] There could be secret documents in every country. But every piece of information on what happened in France [as heard] was handed over to the French authorities back in 1990.

[Correspondent] Everybody is curious to know what role the East European political leaders played in the Carlos affair at the time. Did you hand over every bit of information in connection with this as well?

[Fabian] The investigation contained no data whatsoever which would have proved the political leaders' guilt. [end recording]

Witness on Carlos Visits

LD1708222494 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Passages within quotation marks recorded]

[Excerpts] In Hungary, Carlos acquired money with the knowledge and—what is more—with the help of the Hungarian counterterrorism service to cover the expenses of his stay in Hungary, says Eduardo Rozsa who, according to a Hungarian daily, helped Carlos wherever he could. Rozsa wants to bring an action against the editorial board of the daily for what they wrote about him. But he was willing to talk about Carlos to "Newsreel."

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At that time Rozsa was a customs officer at Ferihegy [Budapest airport] and he had ties with the Hungarian counterintelligence service. [passage omitted] Rozsa met Carlos in Hungary four times, first at Ferihegy.

[Begin recording] [Rozsa] A gentleman came up to me within the customs area. In Budapest only diplomats or those with a special permit can enter the customs area. He had a white diplomatic identification document issued by the Hungarian Foreign Ministry.

[Unidentified correspondent] Was he Carlos?

[Rozsa] Yes, we are talking about Carlos. He asked me to take over an attache case from a Spanish citizen who had just arrived because that man would not be allowed in the country as he was on a persona non grata list. I asked him what was in the case. Money, he said. Alright, I went to my area and made a report to the officers on duty—not customs officers but Interior Ministry officers. [passage omitted]

My immediate senior instructed me not to seek contact with Carlos, but if he sought any contact with me then I should be at his service, with the requirement that I should make a report on the meeting in advance if possible, but afterwards by all means. [end recording] [passage omitted]

According to Rozsa, Carlos could move in Hungary without any restriction and he could meet members of international terrorist organizations.

[Begin Rozsa recording] They travelled with diplomatic passports issued by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Carlos was called (Muhammad Alia Daries). And the man who arrived was a well-known member of the Bader-Meinhof group, who was known as Steve. He [as heard] was totally self-confident. Let me give an example of why I am saying this. A man who arrives at Ferihegy in early spring in a white linen suit and white hat, is not a man who wants to hide. He showed off, he felt himself at home. [end recording]

According to Rozsa, if Carlos spills the beans then proceedings can be launched against the former political leaders of the East European countries.

[Begin Rozsa recording] The situation of those who were politically in charge at the time a bit.... [pauses] they may be a bit nervous now. They may think over what they have done and what they made possible at that time. [end recording]

Intelligence Chief Views Tasks, Crime Situation

AU1808112194 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 13 Aug 94 p 19

[Interview with Bela Katona, minister without portfolio in charge of the National Security Office and the Information Office, by Peter Vajda; place and date not given: "Criminals Use Top Technology"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Vajda] How many copies are made of the reports prepared by the Information Office and the National Security Office, and who receives these reports?

[Katona] Some information is sent to some officials, like the prime minister, the head of the National Security Cabinet, the foreign minister, and myself. Of course, the president of the Republic and the chairman of the parliament also receive this information.

[Vajda] In other words, around 10 copies.

[Katona] Yes. The other ministers receive this information selectively, but not because we do not want them to receive information or because we do not trust them, but because we do not want to burden them with the need to read material that does not help them in their everyday work. There are also daily operative reports; regarding these reports, I decide on who will receive this information immediately, on the basis of whether think this information can be useful for them.

[Vajda] What is the quality of these secret documents?

[Katona] The professional activity of our offices is good, or mostly good. It is not accidental that the international club of intelligence services accepted our organizations quite quickly. This cannot be achieved by any political pressure.

[Vajda] Public opinion, however, draws its conclusions from concrete cases. For example, there is a terrorist attack and the terrorists are not caught. The public shows a certain skepticism about your efficiency.

[Katona] I think that precisely the areas that represent a new task for us will be at the center of public attention in the near future, because the Hungarian intelligence services did not deal with antiterrorist activities, organized crime, and drugs before. [passage omitted]

[Vajda] How strong is organized crime in Hungary?

[Katona] It is increasing. Representatives of various foreign organizations show up in Hungary. Here, I mean organizations engaged in money laundering and investments. It also seems that Hungarian organized crime is becoming stronger by developing certain contacts. Therefore, it is very important for us to be able to defeat them in this phase of their development, or at least to put them under surveillance and interfere at certain points when their influence has not yet spread over the various areas of economic and political life.

[Vajda] Is organized crime present in politics, or is it present near the political sphere?

[Katona] It is very difficult to answer this question.... This is precisely the area that I view as the task of the intelligence service from among the tasks related to organized crime....

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[Vajda] In other words, to avoid the infiltration of organized crime into politics and state life.

[Katona] To prevent their infiltration into considerable positions in the economic sphere and, subsequently, into political life with the help of laundered money. We do not have precise data and proof of this, and I do not think they have yet succeeded in penetrating the major sphere of our political life. However, we have information about small groups that called themselves parties, groups that were at least in contact with various parts of organized crime in Hungary. Fortunately, these forces failed to play a considerable political role in Hungary. [passage omitted]

[Vajda] Do you have many cases of espionage?

[Katona] We must differentiate between espionage affecting Hungary and the activity that uses Hungarian territory for gathering information against another state. The relevant organizations must also keep an eye on espionage activity that is not directed against us. Similarly, the intelligence organizations that cooperate with us should also inform us about meetings organized on our territory, meetings at which the target is not Hungary.

Security Chief Cited Further on Tasks, Problems

94CH0363A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 18 Jul 94 p 4

[Unattributed report on interview with Bela Katona, minister without portfolio and head of the National Security Office and the Intelligence Office, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "Bela Katona: No One Should Be Watched for Political Reasons"]

[Text] Bela Katona (MSZP) [Hungarian Socialist Party] is minister without portfolio in the government that was formed over the weekend. He is in charge of two civilian intelligence services: the National Security Office and the super-secret Information Office, responsible for gathering foreign intelligence. We interviewed him about his impressions of these services.

Katona sees several serious problems, the issue of stability being number one among them. What this requirement means first and foremost is that such organizations cannot afford to have significant turnovers of expert personnel. "In these kinds of agencies when one or two persons leave in a year, they start investigating what might have prompted them to go. In our organization hundreds of people have left just recently for various reasons." The causes behind this mass exodus may be many, including both justified and unjustified political considerations, but in addition, hundreds have sought other employment to make a better living." If this process continues it will take a great toll on our intelligence services," the new minister warned.

Another problem: a legal background that remains unsettled. The national security statute is still in draft form; Katona feels that while certain changes will have to be made, they can be accomplished quickly. What is needed is for parliament to pass the legislation this year yet or early next year.

Bela Katona believes that from time to time, the government needs to define the main directions in which the secret services should expend their efforts. Moreover, the services can also be expected to improve their efficiency in analyzing and processing the collected information. Leaders will need shorter and more succinctly summarized materials put before them so that they can make and prepare decisions in a more timely manner. If the prime minister is handed a single page of concise, real, and important information on a particular subject, there is a chance that he may actually read it and use it."

Katona is working to provide publicity for everything that is necessary to secure society's support. He has not decided, however, whether or not to reintroduce the spokesman system in the National Security Office in order to further that aim.

He responds sincerely when asked how much he knows about the not always exemplary or unblemished relationship between the intelligence services and the police. His view is that when it comes to overlapping areas of responsibility it is practically impossible to prevent a certain degree of rivalry from manifesting itself; however, it must be ensured that this rivalry does not undermine effectiveness under any circumstances, and that the rules of cooperation are adhered to in the fairest possible manner. He intends to discuss all of the issues involved with the interior minister and everyone concerned at the earliest possible time.

He thinks it is stretching things a bit to claim that Hungary today has assumed the same role that was played by Turkey and Portugal during the world war, namely, that it has become a spies' paradise. At the same time, he acknowledges the fact that the nature of the neighborhood—i.e., the fact that there is a war going on not far from our southern frontier, and that to the east we share a border with part of a dismantled world power—has led to an increase in the number of agents dispatched here by their respective services. It is incumbent, he says, on the Hungarian services to learn about such activities even if they are not aimed directly at our country, and they do keep tabs on them. "We have fairly good information about what is going on in the country in this regard." When asked he told us that he had found nothing to suggest that the outgoing government had used the intelligence services against the opposition, and that he did not feel much like starting a post-facto investigation. " What I would like is to ensure that on my watch no one is tapped or kept under watch for political reasons."

And finally, when asked whether or not he was considering to make significant personnel change he said: "For now, I am not planning to make any changes. I believe that a new minister must get to know the leaders he is working with thoroughly, and base any personnel-related decisions on their work and performance."

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Reorganization of Industry, Trade Ministry

94CH0350A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 7 Jul 94 p 5

[Unattributed article: "Without Fist Law; Meeting of Leaders in Ministry of Industry"]

[Text] The way the industry and trade portfolios will be merged, and how the new organization will develop, will be determined not by fist law, but by the tasks, by the work to be performed, Laszlo Pal, the future head of the Ministry of Industry and Trade [IKM] told NEPSZABADSAG. At yesterday's extraordinary meeting of IKM leaders, the topic was the framework of reorganization and issues of the merger still in need of clarification. The meeting was also attended by Attila Soos Karoly, representative of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], who was nominated to be parliamentary undersecretary of the industrial portfolio.

We learned from the future minister that the meeting was called primarily because in the past years there were numerous changes in the legal environment, and especially in the legal conditions connected with the industrial portfolio. For instance, the Hungarian Energy Office which will start operation in the next few days will in any case influence the ministry's organization. Meanwhile, the regulations concerning domestic trade changed in several areas, and this must also be taken into consideration. The portfolio's involvement in privatization has changed recently, and further modifications are expected. The Socialist politician stated that for the time being he would not take any steps which could render later adjustments to the newly developing laws of privatization difficult.

Another important topic at the extraordinary meeting of leaders was the merger of the ministries of industry and trade. According to Laszlo Pal, only in a few areas are there functional overlaps between the two organizations. In order that tasks can be organized and implemented in a more functional and clear fashion in the future, thorough research will be necessary. Separate preparatory committees will be set up to deal with the mergers of individual departments and with changes in personnel. The future minister intends to implement the reorganization very carefully, considering every possible point of view. In personnel issues, professional abilities, and performance up to now will be of primary importance. Because both ministries have many well trained specialists whom one would like to count on in the future as well, considerations will not be easy. According to Laszlo Pal, the solution of organizational problems will cause at least as much headache as personnel matters. As he said, the extent of organizational and personnel changes will be dictated exclusively by he tasks lying ahead.

New Government Oath Seen Violating Tradition

94CH0358C Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 20 Jul 94 p 7

[Commentary by Andras Veer: "So Help Me God"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] While witnessing the solemn moments of our new government taking form suddenly I felt a void inside. Not because of the make-up of the coalition or even the announcement of names of the coalition members, but because something was badly missing at the end of their oath. Especially the line included in the title of this article. Today the omission may be called a gesture of "symbolic importance." To me it was simply a clumsy and incomplete oath. Does a government become socialist, liberal, or social-liberal by striking from its dictionary a word usage which to me bears no religious connotations but rather signifies respect for tradition? It certainly isn't what makes the "bloc" left-wing, as the Fidesz [Federation of Young Democrats] and the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] like to describe the freely elected government in an interesting display of concordance. So why then was the line left out of the oath? Didn't we all use the common phrase "I swear to God" to lend weight to our childhood promises; and haven't we all, socialists, liberals, and conservatives alike, sung our national anthem at the top of our lungs? Hasn't the March of the Republic era of the 1950's crumbled to dust yet?

Yes, all of this did happen, yet now in this damn[illegible]d democracy of ours we can—if I am correct—even [illegible]se our own oath formulas. It would be interesting to find out whether or not the British Workers Party, the German and Austrian social democrats, or the Italian socialist and liberal parties take different oaths, leaving God's name out. And I would really be interested in learning how the socialists and the liberals had worked all of this out, who had recommended the uniformity. For I do not believe that everyone in the government is an atheist, or that none of them respect tradition. But it could also be that this was simply a demonstration, a warning that henceforth we would enjoy so much freedom that we can even cast our traditions by the wayside. In any case, the anticipated moment left a sour taste in my mouth.

Article Views Effect of Chains on Small Stores

94CH0350B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 4 Jul 94 p 12

[Article by Zsuzsa Gal: "Small Merchants Afraid of Large Ones"]

[Text] On the long run, the population will not be able to support as many grocery stores as there are today in the country, economists and administration experts unanimously agree. Who will lose out? Not the large chains by any means, rather small merchants with one or two stores. They are the ones who cannot compete with the large ones. Therefore, about 200 of them who want to survive put a new logo over their store today which reads: "Our Family."

The trend which former school books characterized by "the big fish eating the small ones" has begun in the case of grocery stores. Supermarkets of chains such as Plus, Profi, Spar, or Kaiser's, are crowded from opening to

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closing time; the cash registers can hardly manage to swallow the millions. Small stores, on the other hand, have few customers, even if they are open day and night.

There could be a number of reasons for this phenomenon. Many people got used to less frequent, but larger shopping trips, like to use the parking lots of the supermarkets, like to choose from a large selection, but most customers are attracted ultimately by the lower prices of the chains. Even if only the prices of a few basic products are lower in the stores of Profi or Plus, because one is apt to think that if sugar, flour, margarine, and oil is cheaper in a store, everything else is cheaper, as well. It is possible, though, that only those products are cheaper the price of which one is likely to remember.

They are cheaper, but why? The foreign, frequently multinational companies of solid capital use professional methods in Hungary, as well. First of all, they do not necessarily expect their supermarkets in Hungary to yield a high profit within the first years. At first they are content if millions of consumers become familiar with their name and get used to shopping there.

But there is a lot more to it. The chains that have stores throughout the country buy not from wholesalers, but directly from producers, and thereby save, or rather appropriate, the wholesale margin (as well). They order huge quantities, and therefore can buy the goods at even lower prices. We could say that they drive a hard bargain with their suppliers. However, they go beyond bargaining about prices. They even demand money from the producers for allowing their products into their stores. This sum, called "shelf money" or "list money," which almost every supplier is forced to pay, with the exception of certain producers in a position of monopoly such as the Pick Salami Factory, makes it possible to knock down the consumer price even further.

And it makes many other things possible. Although the amount spent on advertising is treated as a closely guarded secret, we can estimate the order of magnitude from the giant billboards, the radio and television commercials, the half- or whole-page ads in the papers, and the colorful, photographed fliers in the mailboxes.

Recognizing the unequal conditions, afraid of falling behind in the competition and of the uncertain future, first only a dozen small merchants united and founded the CBA [Commercial Business Association] association. Its members—the number of whom has since grown to about 50—try to compete with the large ones by purchasing together, appearing on the market together, coordinating prices, constructing a warehouse base, and—we are a people quick to grasp—by demanding shelf money.

Now others have taken a similar path, and suddenly a relatively large number of merchants, more than 200. Not on their own initiative; the impetus came from the Alfa Corporation, owned largely by foreign investors, which still tries to make a living largely from wholesale activity. Although the company's sales last year surpassed those of 1993 [as in the original] by 1 billion forints [Ft], and its trading results grew considerably, by 34 percent, that is to say, the company is not in direct danger, Chairman and Managing Director Zsigmond Lednyiczky is still cautious. In his estimation, if many of the small businesses go bankrupt under the pressure of the large chains, then Alfa's sales will also perceptibly decrease.

Therefore, Alfa's representatives recently paid individual visits to a part of their stable customers—only ones with a reputation of being honest merchants, and ones they were able to visit in such a short time—and offered them cooperation which promised an increase in sales.

As of 4 July, merchants who join the system called "Our Family" and put its logo above their stores will receive approximately 100 basic food items and household chemicals at a discount from Alfa. However, they are obliged to constantly stock about 70 percent of the discounted articles, and sell them with a profit margin no larger than the one recommended by Alfa—14 percent on the average. In return, Alfa takes care of advertising the "Our Family" system, provides the stores with advertising media (logos, price tags with emblems, stickers, badges, fliers, etc.), and with useful information.

The majority of merchants accepted the offer, and the chairman of Alfa thinks that the system will have at least 2,000 members by the end of the year. However, he does not intend to take shelf money from the suppliers even if they would be willing to pay, considering the extent of the system. He does not consider the method to be ethical.

However, he considers it inevitable for small merchants to form an alliance with each other and with their wholesale supplier. The future of neither is secure otherwise, because producers usually do not supply small merchants who own just a few stores, and if the small businesses lose ground because they are exposed to hard competition and lack advertising and supplier discounts, the future of the wholesaler does not appear stable, either.

Today 120 stores in Budapest, and another 110 in the countryside, will be outfitted with "Our Family's" orange logo with the green umbrella. Profi, Plus, and the others will hardly fear this competition, but the approximately 60,000 merchants in the country will probably ponder whether they would become even more defenseless if they only saw an opponent in the neighboring storekeeper.

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Zacharski Resigns as Head of Intelligence

LD1808133094 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1302 GMT 18 Aug 94

[Text] Warsaw, 18 Aug—Marian Zacharski, head of the State Protection Office Intelligence Directorate, resigned today from his post.

Walesa Opposes Intelligence Chief's Appointment

LD1708140594 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1326 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Text] Warsaw, 17 Aug—President Lech Walesa today asked Minister of Internal Affairs Andrzej Milczanowski to change the decision concerning the appointment of Marian Zacharski to the post of head of the State Protection Office [UOP] Intelligence Directorate, Andrzej Zakrzewski, head of the Office for Political Services to the President, has told PAP.

"The president fully appreciates his professionalism and the experience of many years acquired in the special services. He is of the opinion, however, that the appointment might hinder the process of Poland's integration with the West," Zakrzewski writes in a communique that says he has been authorized to issue such a statement.

Minister Milczanowski has been on leave, a PAP journalist was told today at the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Stand Called 'Game'

WS1808075494 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 18 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by "LUZ," "PJW," and "POZ": "Zacharski Must Go"]

[Text] *President Lech Walesa has asked the chief of the Internal Affairs Ministry [MSW] to dismiss Marian Zacharski, a "superspy" from the Polish People's Republic [PRL] era, from the post of chief of intelligence of the Office of State Protection [UOP].*

According to Andrzej Zakrzewski of the Office of the President of the Republic of Poland, Lech Walesa fully appreciates Zacharski's professionalism, but he also thinks that the appointment could prove an obstacle in the process of Poland's integration with the West.

It would be hard to expect Andrzej Milczanowski to respond to the president's letter anytime soon because he is on vacation, and, as ZYCIE WARSZAWY was told by MSW officials, the minister will learn the exact contents of the letter only after he is back from vacation, which means after 5 September. UOP Director Gromoslaw Czempinski is also on vacation.

Even before Walesa's decision, the appointment of Zacharski, an agent of the PRL secret services for many years, who was convicted and sentenced in the United States to life imprisonment in 1981, later to be released in exchange for a U.S. spy, was condemned by Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who described the appointment as "morally disgusting" and said it undermines Poland's efforts to become a member of NATO. "The appointment should be withdrawn and those who made it removed from their posts because they could have ties to the KGB," Brzezinski stated. Jan Nowak-Jezorianski took a similar stand on the issue.

The president's demand caused confusion in the ranks of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], which had taken a positive stand on Zacharski's appointment. A clearly irritated Jerzy Dziewulski tried to reassure reporters that the appointment must have been the subject of consultation with the Belweder before it happened. [SLD Press Spokesman] Zbigniew Siemiatkowski's view is that either Walesa is playing another game in front of his electorate, or he has succumbed to pressure from the United States.

Even though Sejm deputies for the SLD have been trying to send the message that the reason they are bothered by the Zacharski case is that MSW interests are at stake, there is unofficial talk that the appointment of the major was the result of a Belweder-SLD agreement. In that case, the most recent statement by Walesa would be a breach of that agreement. "The president decided to go along not with us but with the opposition," a Sejm deputy for the SLD told ZYCIE WARSZAWY.

We have also learned from a high-ranking MSW official who wanted to remain anonymous that Walesa is supposed to have known about the appointment of Zacharski ahead of time, and he is supposed to have approved the candidacy.

Daily Reports Further on Zacharski Case

WS1808095794 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 18 Aug 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Zbigniew Wasik and DZ: "The Superspy Under Attack"]

[Text] The nomination of Marian Zacharski as head of the civil intelligence service of the Office of State Protection [UOP] has caused a real storm. On 17 August, President Lech Walesa asked Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej Milczanowski to rescind the nomination for Zacharski. In the meantime...

Minister Andrzej Milczanowski will be on vacation until 5 September, and the president's letter will be handed over to him when he gets back to work. Such information has been given to PAP by Janusz Wolny, deputy press spokesman of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW]. Jerzy Zimowski and Henryk Jasik, deputy ministers of internal affairs, as well as UOP Head Gromoslaw Czempinski were not available to journalists on 17 August.

Upon his return from Ukraine, Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak, asked by a TRYBUNA journalist what he thinks about the president's demand that Marian Zacharski be immediately recalled, replied: "I am not here to comment on the president's statements."

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Opponents of Zacharski's nomination to the post of intelligence service head claim that he may complicate our relations with the United States. Minister Andrzej Zakrzewski stated in a communique that was given to the mass media that he was empowered to issue the following statement: "The president of the Polish Republic fully appreciates his professionalism and experience acquired over the many years of work in special services. He believes, however, that this nomination might impede the process of integration with the West."

At FBI headquarters in Washington, we asked whether the leadership of the U.S. special services, which discovered Zacharski's espionage activities in the United States, had an opinion on his new function. We found that, "in such cases, the FBI does not offer any opinions."

Jerzy Dziewulski, deputy chairman of the Sejm Administration and the Internal Affairs Committee, told us that he was taken aback by this nomination.

It is a fact that Zacharski caused some trouble for the Americans, Jerzy Dziewulski said, and this is why his nomination may be difficult for them to accept. However, if we take into account the cooperation of Polish special services with the U.S. intelligence services, we may consider it very likely that this nomination has been in one way or another (of course, unofficially and secretly) discussed and was made with the tacit agreement of the Americans.

Incidentally, if this were not the case, Milczanowski and Czempinski would have to be suicidal.

It is also difficult to believe that this nomination took the president aback. Because the MSW is a so-called presidential ministry, the president most certainly knew about it. Even if he did not know anything about it personally, his closest aides certainly did, which is one and the same.

A former high-ranking intelligence service officer told TRYBUNA that, if we look at the entire case from a purely professional standpoint—and only this way of looking at it makes sense—we should suppose that the Americans prefer the intelligence service of Poland, which is their ally now, to be steered by a professional, even if he acted against them in the past, than by a politically clean dilettante.

"We have never discussed nominations to the post of head of the intelligence services with our allies. These have always been our own decisions," said Czeslaw Kiszczak, former minister of internal affairs and an intelligence officer. "If I were minister of internal affairs now or UOP head, I would at least try to examine the background. If I knew that the decision would not be accepted favorably, I would not sign such a nomination."

The president demands that Zacharski be recalled, even though everything seems to indicate that he knew about this nomination. What is going on, then? Probably the following: The hue and cry was raised by the right wing, so the president has the following alternative: He may either support it or not—which would mean supporting the left wing.

It is also very likely that Walesa wants to take advantage of the Zacharski case as a pretext for another "war in high places." It is common knowledge that, apart from angling and doing crossword puzzles, it is his favorite pastime.

Marian Zacharski has been in charge of the UOP intelligence services since 15 August. The president's letter demanding his recall will be handed over to Milcznowski no sooner than 5 September, when he returns to work from vacation. If we assume that the president is right, then, for 20 days, the Polish intelligence services will be headed by an irresponsible person. What consequence might this have?

It is difficult to believe that Gromoslaw Czempinski and Andrzej Milczanowski are dilettantes. Therefore, it seems well-founded to ask the following question: What is really going on in the Zacharski case?

Zacharski, Kuklinski, U.S., Soviet Role Viewed

WS1808100094 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 18 Aug 94 p 2

[Commentary by Piotr Gerczuk under the "Points of View" rubric: "Zacharski or Kuklinski?"]

[Text] *Is it possible that not only Mr. Goryszewski but also President Walesa is ignorant of what happens inside "the Belweder domain?"*

The first piece of information to reach me—quite accidentally, by the way—was this: A famous spy had been appointed chief of civilian intelligence at the Office of State Protection [UOP]. "Is it Kuklinski?" I asked. The question remained unanswered, and even though I know now that the post was given to Marian Zacharski, the most famous spy of the secret services of the Polish People's Republic [PRL], not of the United States, I keep wondering about the fate of these two men, who both succeeded in dismantling some essential elements of the security systems of the USSR and the United States as few had done before.

According to Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej Milczanowski, the criteria that were used in choosing Marian Zacharski as intelligence chief were professional qualifications, personal intelligence, and familiarity with foreign intelligence services ("especially with Soviet intelligence," one could add here, but that would be too inconsiderate a statement). It is worth noting that, during the apprehension of Zacharski in the United States as a Polish spy, he must have talked on many occasions not only to ordinary officials of the Washington administration responsible for security issues, but also to chiefs of U.S. special services. The fact that Zacharski was returned in exchange for 25 minor spies detained by USSR and PRL special services is proof of how much Zacharski's skills were appreciated.

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What can we say? Mr. Milczanowski's view is thus being confirmed—which is echoed by Janusz Korwin-Mikke, a pragmatic leader of the Union of Real Politics—that Zacharski is indeed quite a professional. Still, Kuklinski is no worse, is he not? In his case, however, it would be harder to obtain proof. Bits and pieces of reports about what kind of rage was caused in Moscow by the information relayed by Kuklinski to U.S. military intelligence can be found in various reports and documents about events in the 1980's. Colonel Kuklinski talked about that in more detail during his press interviews, and these facts were indirectly confirmed in statements made by Generals Jaruzelski and Kiszczak.

So, is it possible that, despite everything, Kuklinski was a worse professional than Zacharski? Kuklinski has one important flaw: He never got directly in touch with or spoke with his opponents—officials of Soviet special services. Because we in Poland are quite far from the United States, it is hard to say whether Col. Kuklinski's children have not had any contact with such officials, either. The two tragedies that have recently affected Kuklinski, who remains in hiding—that is, the deaths of his daughter and his son—do not happen to just anybody. I really do not think they were just accidental.

It is clear to a majority of Polish politicians and to observers of the political scene that Zacharski must have cooperated with Soviet special services.

It would be hard to imagine information obtained by Kuklinski from the U.S. Silicon Valley or plans of the most modern aircraft designs to have reached the desks of chiefs of Soviet civilian and not military (GRU) intelligence. Col. Kuklinski was so familiar with GRU operations, and it is one of the world's most efficient intelligence services, which employs—and here is a little information for Mr. Milczanowski—the most talented and the most competent people under the sun, who are experts of different nationalities.

When asked about suggestions that Zacharski may have cooperated with Soviet special services, spokesmen for the Internal Affairs Ministry [MSW] respond by saying: Where is the proof? Either they are really so naive, or they are really trying very hard to mislead the public. After all, they are the same MSW men who tried to make the argument that any proof may be fabricated, any spy may be protected, and any ordinary citizen may be made a spy. If the MSW chiefs were equally eloquent in persecuting the petty gangsters of Wolomin, we would have all East and West European Mafia leaders behind the bars of the PRL—sorry, I mean Polish—prisons.

The appointment of Mr. Zacharski caused some irritation among the political class. Sejm Deputy Bujak, who also happens to be chairman of the Sejm Internal Affairs Commission, is opposed to the appointment. For the past five years, however, he did everything in his power to reinstate people such as the professional Zacharski back in power. So, Mr. Bujak, do not try to make it look like you are really that naive. The behavior of Henryk Goryszewski, chief of the National Security Bureau [BBN], is also interesting. He should have been very well informed about the reasons behind the appointment of Zacharski to lead civilian intelligence—namely, what Mr. Goryszewski decided to say is that it would be a good thing to know whether or not "the nominee" had cooperated with the KGB. The BBN chief should be familiar with Minister Milczanowski's policies. After all, they are both under President Walesa.

As it turns out, however, it is not just Mr. Goryszewski who is not well informed about what is happening in "the Belweder domain," but also the president himself (he demanded the withdrawal of Zacharski's appointment only after it had been announced).

So, there is definitely overall irritation. Protests are being sent, and stands and statements are being declared. When I recall how little the same people did to reinstate the rights of a citizen of the Polish Republic back to Col. Kuklinski, I simply refuse to believe that all of the appeals and indignation are genuine.

What remain are just facts. Marian Zacharski is to be chief of UOP's civilian intelligence. According to various sources, his candidacy was the subject of consultation with the Americans. Nobody, however, reports on any consultation with Moscow. Is it possible that it is so obvious that it is not even worth mentioning?

TV Says Deputy Head of Intelligence To Resign

LD1708212494 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1730 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Relayed by TV Polonia Network]

[Text] We have unofficially learned that Piotr Niemczyk, deputy head of the Intelligence Service, will in the near future leave the State Protection Office [UOP]. He is one of the few UOP officers at this level who comes from the former anticommunist opposition. Niemczyk denies that his decision to leave the service is connected with the appointment of Marian Zacharski.

After the resignation of Piotr Niemczyk, only one official originating from the pre-August 1980 opposition will remain in a responsible office in UOP—Konstanty Miodowicz, head of the Counterintelligence Service. At present, UOP is headed by Gromoslaw Czempinski; Wiktor Fafara is the head of the Investigations Directorate, and Marian Zacharski heads the Intelligence Service. All are employees of the former communist Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW]. Various departments are also headed by officers who started their careers in the ministry well before 1989. Colonel Janusz Stradowski, who heads a group dealing with political parties, which comes under the Office of Analysis and Intelligence, was also an officer of the former MSW.

A UOP officer who wanted to remain anonymous and who started work after the collapse of communism told us: Frankly, we have never had much say, but now there is no hope we ever will.

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Jerzy Konieczny, the head of UOP between 1992 and 1993, refused to comment on the situation. However, Piotr Naimski, who headed the Office under the Olszewski government, told us that he wanted people who were not discredited by their communist past to work at UOP. This, however, did not mean the dismissal of all employees of the former secret service.

[Begin Piotr Naimski recording, identified by caption] We assumed that some people with certain skills could stay but I would never have thought that they could hold publicly and politically exposed posts. Those people who were mostly opposed to personnel changes in UOP say that a good officer can be trained in three years. Thank goodness, four years have passed since the office was created, and there are very few new people. We wanted to start this process. [end recording]

Neither UOP head Gromoslaw Czempinski nor his spokeswoman Irena Popoff had time to comment on the television news bulletin about personnel policy in their institution.

Slovak Prime Minister Arrives on One-Day Visit

LD1808085194 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0833 GMT 18 Aug 94

[Text] Warsaw, 18 Aug—Jozef Moravcik, prime minister of the Slovak Republic, arrived on Thursday for a one-day visit to Poland. He was officially welcomed by Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak outside the Council of Ministers' Office.

Ten bilateral agreements will be signed during the visit, including agreements on economic cooperation and trade, on avoiding double taxation, on supporting and protecting investments, and on border cooperation.

Prime Minister Moravcik will meet President Lech Walesa. He will also meet Sejm and Senate speakers and Minister Andrzej Olechowski.

Ukrainian, Belarusian Policy Changes Foreseen

94EP0079A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 30, 23 Jul 94 p 11

[Article by Krzysztof Mroziewicz: "Even Closer to Russia: Belarus and Ukraine"]

[Text] Travel from Minsk to Kiev by the circuitous route via Moscow still remains more comfortable than by the direct route via Chernobyl because sleeping-car trains cruise on the former route, while taking the unpopular route via Chernobyl means sitting in coaches of shunted single-track trains. Now, after the elections in the two former Soviet republics, will the road to Moscow be shorter? This question is pondered by Europe and the world.

In both countries, Belarus and Ukraine, the newly elected presidents used to manage former Soviet enterprises (Aleksander Lukashenka managed an agricultural enterprise and Leonid Kuchma an armaments enterprise), and they would like to repair within the [Russia-Ukraine-Belarus] Triangle what had been damaged in the Bialowieza Forest by their predecessors, the Belarusian Stanislav Shuskevich and the Ukrainian Leonid Kravchuk, together with Boris Yeltsin, when they had met there to create the Commonwealth of Independent States, except that nowadays people do not know how to call that construct.

"Those who do not regret the collapse of the Soviet Union are heartless, and those who regret it are brainless," is the saying in the predominantly Russian-speaking capital of Ukraine, Kiev.

The results of the presidential elections in Belarus and Ukraine show that, in both countries, people voted with their hearts.

But what about the brain or the head? The head, even if, as the Russians say, it is "iz pokhmeliya" or has a hangover, is now located in Moscow. Kuchma and Lukashenka are not going to glue together the Soviet Union anew because to Russia that would be too costly an undertaking nowadays.

Aleksander Lukashenka, who is promising to settle the hash of the mafia, would like to resemble a sheriff from a good Western but, rather, resembles Aleksander Rutskoy. As a candidate for president of Belarus, he used to say what the local populace liked to hear, but he couched it in the language of [the writer Mikhail] Bulgakov: "After I win the election, I will exile all officialdom to either the Alps or the Himalayas."

The then Prime Minister of Belarus Vyacheslav Kiebich, who also was a candidate for the presidency, vied with Lukashenka in making pro-Russian declarations of fraternal alliance with brotherly Russia.

In contrast, the bones of electoral contention between former Prime Minister of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma and the then President Leonid Kravchuk were sovereignty and missiles. Kravchuk wanted to preserve national sovereignty and get rid of the missiles, while Kuchma wanted to retain the missiles and forfeit part of national sovereignty.

It might be assumed that Kravchuk, who was the ideologist of the Ukrainian Communist Party in the Brezhnev era, knows less about missiles than does Kuchma, who had at the time been involved in making them.

Thus, if Kuchma gives up part of Ukrainian sovereignty, in the economic sense, but retains the missiles, it may be that he believes he will become a more sovereign president of Ukraine than Kravchuk. After all, a nation that owns missiles is a nation to be reckoned with. That was the logic employed by Kuchma at his first press conference as the president-elect (on 13 July), at which he declared that he was going to scrutinize the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, a treaty he would prefer not to renew in the name of Ukraine.

Unlike Leonid Kravchuk, who, in his electoral campaign, had pointed the finger at Russia, Kuchma claims that Ukraine has no enemies.

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Why then should a country lacking enemies need missiles and nuclear weaponry?

Kuchma wants to rebuild the military-industrial complex he used to administer, but this cannot be reconciled with a simultaneous restructuring of production unless the plants that used to be under his management were to develop and manufacture some fantastic object that would change the views on conventional warfare in the 21st century. And, clearly, it would be good if civilian by-products of such an invention, in the form of some new Teflon or a new VCR, were to be marketed.

But the problem is that Leonid Kuchma is accustomed to the heavy arms industry and certainly does not have the billions of dollars needed to translate such an undertaking into reality.

Those who voted for Kuchma were people who did not want to vote for Kravchuk, and vice versa.

According to the participants in the roundtable discussion organized by RADIA SVOBODA (also on 13 July), neither Kuchma nor, more so, Lukashenka is going to fulfill his electoral promises because, as Georges Simenon once put it, such is the logic of the presidency.

To the West, the results of the elections in the two largest Slavic republics next to Russia present no problem, unless Leonid Kuchma creates a problem. To Poland, there may be a problem because the West is discreetly rejecting us, and we sometimes quite openly reject the West.

As for Belarus, it has more soldiers in proportion to its population than any other country in the world. The losers in the elections were the patriots who wanted to share with Poles Oginski, Kosciuszko, and Moniuszko on the grounds that, in the past, nations were political rather than ethnic concepts [as published].

Now, under President Aleksander Lukashenka, they would rather share their heritage with the Russians, which should present no major problems in Minsk, where no minister of state speaks Belarusian. This may seem strange considering that only 13 percent of the population of Belarus is Russian, compared with 23 percent in Ukraine (and 8 percent in Lithuania, 30 percent in Estonia, 33 percent in Latvia, and as much as 37 percent in Kazakhstan).

Yet, to cite a report in THE FINANCIAL TIMES (also of 13 July), Aleksander Lukashenka declared that he would do everything possible to bring about economic and monetary unification with Russia because "There is no other way out of the economic crisis in which Belarus is stuck." Thus, that president is categorically opposed to the withdrawal of 40,000 troops from his country's territory. He supports the command economy and is ready to meet with businessmen as soon as the next day in order to tell them, "Help me, and I'll help you."

Yet, at the same time, he has promised to halt privatization because people believe that "this is a process whereby criminals alone benefit."

Leonid Kuchma differs from the president of Belarus chiefly in that, although he is a Ukrainian himself, he must (and does) try to gain a decent command of the Ukrainian language in order to avoid a conflict between Kiev and Western Ukraine—that is, Lviv. Moreover, he is in no hurry to join the ruble zone because he cannot give up Ukraine's sovereignty to such an extent. He prefers to give up the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet (which anyway nobody needs that much nowadays).

[Box, p 11]

Leonid Kuchma

Fifty-five years old, mechanical engineer, born in the Ukrainian village of Chaykina. His father fell in defense of Leningrad, his mother worked all her life in a kolkhoz, and his older brother and sister worked in a mine. In 1960, he graduated from Dnepropetrovsk University and began working at the Pivdenne Design Bureau, which was part of a Soviet missile complex. At age 28, he became head of technical supervision at the Baikonur Cosmodrome and, in 1982, was appointed first deputy chief designer.

In the years 1986-92, he was the CEO of the Yuzhmash Dnepropetrovsk Association, the Soviet Union's largest arms factory, which until recently built SS-18 missiles and the latest type SS-24 missiles.

He was nominated to the post of prime minister as a representative of the influential lobby of managers of arms industry plants active in the center-left coalition, "New Ukraine" Union. The principal plank of that grouping's political program advocated carrying out economic reforms in the Gaidar style.

In October 1992, Kuchma headed the government, but, a year later, after falling out with President Kravchuk and under pressure from the mining and steel lobby of Donbass managers, he submitted his resignation. When, at the same time, the decision was taken to schedule early elections to the parliament, Kuchma began to create his own political movement, the Interregional Bloc for Reforms, which soon split apart. Even so, the former prime minister became Leonid Kravchuk's main contender for the post of president of Ukraine.

He owes his electoral victory to the fact that the public remembered him as the sole Ukrainian prime minister during whose rule the economic situation had slightly improved. He publicly championed combating corruption and mafia structures.

He is a laureate of the Lenin Award and the Ukrainian State Award. He is a professor at Dnepropetrovsk University and a scientific associate of the Engineering Academy of Ukraine.

He is married and has a daughter. In his leisure hours, he likes to strum a guitar.

[Box, p 11]

Aleksander Lukashenka

Born in 1954, raised without a father. Graduate of the Mohylev Teacher Training Institute (1971-75) and the

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Belarusian Agricultural Academy. Used to be a people's deputy in the former Soviet Union. By profession, a teacher of history and an organizer of farm production at a sovkhoz.

In the years 1975-77, he worked as a political instructor for the western border district at Brest.

In 1977, he again became Komsomol committee secretary, and, subsequently, he was appointed secretary of the Lenin Kolkhoz Party Committee and deputy kolkhoz chairman at Shklovo.

Since 1987, he was director of the Gorodets Sovkhoz near Mohylev. He has the rank of a major in reserve. He is married and has two children.

Lukashenka is called "the Belarusian Zhirinovskiy." He became famous as the head of a parliamentary committee for combating corruption when he made public the ties to the mafia of many politicians.

At his first press conference after his electoral victory, Lukashenka pledged a continued resolute struggle against corruption ("Even now a plane for the Himalayas is awaiting 70 politicians"). He wants to base foreign policy on the alliance of Slavic countries—Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.

The staff of the first president in the history of Belarus includes young and competent people who, most importantly, desire to preserve the nation's independence. As for Lukashenka himself, he recently swore that, if the need arises, he would genuflect to Moscow if that is what it takes to admit Belarus to the Russian Federation. He also criticized the idea of introducing a separate national currency for Belarus.

The first president does not even speak Belarusian correctly. He speaks the so-called Drasanka—that is, a mixture of the Russian and Belarusian languages typical of the Belarusian countryside. Public opinion views him as a national hero, a Belarusian Robin Hood who will take from rich speculators and the mafia stealing national wealth and give to the poor—that is, to honest laboring people and pensioners. Lukashenka's idols, as he has stated in many interviews, are Feliks Dzierzynski and Theodore Roosevelt.

Daily Details Present Budget Situation

WS1708131594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 17 Aug 94 p 5

[Article by K.J.: "Budget After Seven Months; Expensive Retirement Pensions and Debt"]

[Text] Until the end of this July, expenditures from the state budget exceeded 365 trillion zlotys. Revenues coming into the public coffers during the same period were Z30 trillion lower. Through the end of July, the budget deficit amounted to a little over Z30 trillion.

Just as was predicted, the most expensive operations this year were as follows: subsidies to the Social Insurance Fund [FUS] (that is, employees' retirement and other pensions, as well as benefits [zasilki]), the servicing of the domestic debt, and subsidies to peasants' retirement pensions and other pensions.

Even though less than 49 percent of the amount that was planned to be spent over the entire year (less than Z40.5 trillion out of over Z82.7 trillion) was spent on subsidies to FUS until the end of July this year, this is mainly a consequence of the fact that, at the beginning of the year, the fund had a relatively large amount of its own money. Now the subsidies to FUS are increasing much more quickly, which results, among other things, from the fact that the June valorization of pensions was actually carried out earlier than planned.

Probably for the very same reason—earlier valorization of pensions—subsidies to peasants' retirement and other pensions will also have to be greater than planned. Thus, even though until the end of July more than 57 percent of the entire sum planned for 1994 was spent on peasants' retirement and other pensions, this year's subsidy will have to be increased by another Z1.8 trillion.

Until the end of July, almost 53 percent of what was planned for all of 1994 was spent on servicing the domestic debt. The servicing of the foreign debt has been far less expensive so far: less than 26 percent of the entire expenditure planned for this purpose. This results, however, from the fact that payments are scheduled unequally; the next expenditures are scheduled for the end of September and the beginning of October—we will have to pay off another installment of interest on loans from members of the Paris Club. It is still not known what will be the cost of this year's servicing of the debt we have to pay off to the London Club.

In line with information presented by the Finance Ministry, the greatest revenues were yielded by indirect taxes. Incidentally, this is in accordance with the plans for 1994; the budget law envisioned that the greatest revenues would be yielded by indirect taxes—Z259.6 trillion. Until the end of July, the budget received 55 percent of this sum (Z143.2 trillion).

The situation is worst with regard to revenues from the income tax on legal entities. We reported a month ago that, over the first six months of this year, the budget received only 35.9 percent of the revenues that are supposed to be obtained from this tax in all of 1994. The situation did not improve much after July: Until the end of this month, revenues from the income tax on legal entities amounted to 42.6 percent of the revenues planned for the entire year. The situation will only improve at the end of the year: Taxpayers pay a double advance payment of the personal tax in December.

Already today, we can expect higher revenues from National Bank of Poland [NBP] profits. Until the end of July, these profits already exceeded Z14.368 trillion—that is, 68 percent of the revenues planned for the entire year. It is worth recalling that a similar situation occurred last year, when NBP payments were supposed to amount to Z8.9 trillion and, in reality, exceeded Z14.182 trillion.

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As far as our personal income tax is concerned, until the end of July the budget received Z89.4 trillion—that is, almost 57 percent of the revenues from this source planned for the entire year. Tariffs brought in Z24 trillion—that is, 53 percent of what was planned for the year.

Through the end of July, the budget deficit was indeed relatively low, however, this did not result from the fact that the Finance Ministry at any cost wants to reduce the budget insufficiency. The main reason behind it is probably the difficulty in financing the deficit. Until the end of July, the NBP bought Treasury bonds for less than Z7.173 trillion, whereas it was planned that the bank would spend no less than Z30 trillion on them over the entire year.

Sources of Financing the Deficit (in trillions of zlotys)

	In Line With the 1994 Law	From Jan to Jul 94
Sources of financing the deficit	83.0	31.1
Including:		
Domestic sources	104.4	33.8
—Treasury bonds and credits (without NBP)		24.1
—Treasury bonds bought by NBP	30.0 - 35.0	7.2
—Debentures		18.2
—Others		8.5
—Loan for Orbis S.A. (promissory note for CFTiW [expansion unknown] and for the Fund of Guarantees of Employees' Benefits		70.3
—Payments of long-term debts		13.2
—State of the resources on budget accounts		10.9
Foreign sources	21.4	3.7

Implementation of the State's Budget in the Period Jan-Jul 1994

Revenues (in billions of zlotys)	
Indirect taxes	143,196.5
Income tax from legal entities	34,629.2
Income tax from individuals	89,640.6
Revenues of state-owned budgetary units	44,246.6
Other revenues	23,417.6
Expenditures (in billions of zlotys)	
Servicing of the domestic debt	43,194.0
Servicing of the foreign debt	7,674.0
Subsidies to the Labor Fund	15,230.0
Subsidies to the pension fund	25,803.0
Subsidies to the Social Insurance Fund	40,471.1
Subsidies for Gminas [smallest administrative units]	3,183.1
Other expenditures	229,718.2

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Mladic Called to Belgrade to Discuss Arms

AU1708184494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Text] According to (?reliable) information from the Information Service of the 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, General Manojlo Milovanovic, chief of the general staff of the army of the so-called Serbian republic, was (?sent) under orders of war criminal Radovan Karadzic to the region of (?Nisici) tasked with organizing and [words indistinct] and routed aggressor units after their debacle suffered in [words indistinct] units of the 1st Corps of our Army. The criminal General Milovanovic has the explicit order and authority [words indistinct] executing officers and soldiers in order to establish order and prevent total disarray, especially units that were brought in from outside, (?those) who are refusing to obey, because, as they say, nothing binds them to defend the burned down Muslim villages of [words indistinct]. Milovanovic's tasks alsi include returning [words indistinct] at all costs.

We also have reliable information that war criminal General Ratko Mladic, commander of the general staff of the army of the so-called Serbian republic, has been summoned to Belgrade to the General Staff of the army of the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia for talks on joint activities in connection with the (?General Staff officers') trip to Cyprus aimed at implementing contracts agreed on the purchase of arms, ammunition, and fuel for the army of the so-called Serbian republic.

This illustrates sufficiently to what extent the Belgrade regime has broken off economic, political, and military cooperation with the (?Pale) war criminals. This also shows to what extent Cyprus, that is Greece, objectively [word indistinct] the implementation of the peace process in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Article: Mladic 'Key Man' in Serbian Dispute

AU1708132094 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Aug 94 p 3

[Report by G. Rosic: "General Missed By a Hand Grenade"]

[Text] The 51-year old commander of the Serbian republic army, General Ratko Mladic, whom numerous foreign media claim is "the key man" in the Milosevic-Karadzic conflict because he will soon have to decide for one of them, has been staying on Nisicki Plateau for several weeks, the sources close to the Serbian republic army say. The same sources claim that the first soldier of the Serbian republic is almost constantly on the first lines of combat and, as well as that, a hand grenade thrown from a Muslim trench, only some 20 meters away, landed in his trench few days ago. General Mladic sustained no injuries, however, two of his escorts ended up in the hospital. As we recall, it is not the first time that the life of the general from Bozinovici near Kalinovik has been put in danger on the battlefield. So far, he has escaped an accident some three or four times.

The fact is that lately he has not stated anything directly in favor of either Karadzic's or Milosevic's option in the media. In a statement for Serbian Television some 10 days ago, he spoke about "the need of the Serbian people to defend their homes and the borders of its state in these difficult times." He, thus, did not explicitly speak "for" of "against" the contact group plan, however, according to some assessments, he came closer to the stance of his supreme commander, that is, Dr. Karadzic. A rumor that he recently rejected a demand by President Milosevic to surrender Mount Ozren and the nearby region, which should—according to the contact group map—belong to the Muslims, also supports this and so does the fact that he continues to be very popular among the soldiers of the Serbian republic army, who are mostly opposed to the peace plan of the international community.

It is also beyond any dispute that the Serbian army has scored its biggest military successes precisely thanks to Mladic's strategy, that is, that the army that he has led since 12 May 1992 knows only of victories. Now that the time to withdraw from over 20 percent of the territory has come, to a man who became legendary for his words—withdrawal, I do not know what it means—such a step would mean, according to military analysts, "the destruction of his life's work."

Mladic's recent behavior should be interpreted as a tactical game. Namely, it would be hard to imagine the storm that would rise among the soldiers of the Serbian republic if General Mladic were to publicly support the contact group plan, according to which the Serbian soldiers must withdraw from 13 towns and 10 other large settlements. All this primarily because the Serbian soldiers know well, and some would say, cherish the sentence of their commander: "When I guarantee something for you, it is just as if the Almighty himself would have guaranteed it."

Krajisnik Cited

AU1708140194 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Aug 94 p 3

[BETA agency report: "Mladic Spoke in Favor of Serbian Republic Leadership Policy"]

[Text] Podgorica, BETA—All speculations about a possible change of stance by the Assembly and the leadership of the Serbian republic toward the Contact Group peace plan prior to the referendum are totally unfounded, the speaker of the Serbian republic assembly, Momcilo Krajisnik, stated for the BETA agency.

"We expect some senior statesmen in Pale these days who will be able to mediate in finding a solution that would be acceptable to all three warring sides in the

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former Bosnia-Herzegovina," Krajisnik said in a telephone conversation, without specifying who the statesmen in question might be.

"We also have a new initiative of the Muslim side, after the signing of the anti-sniper agreement, to hold negotiations to improve security in Sarajevo. I believe that a positive outcome of the talks on Bosnia is feasible shortly," Krajisnik said.

When asked about the situation on the battlefield and whether it is true that General Ratko Mladic is hesitating between Radovan Karadzic and Slobodan Milosevic, Krajisnik said that all speculations about this are totally unfounded..... "In preparation for the forthcoming Assembly session, we held a meeting of the Supreme Command, which consists of the president of the republic, the vice president, the assembly chairman, the defense minister, the minister of internal affairs, and the military leadership. The decision was unanimous and in all aspects matched the position and the decision of the Assembly and the state leadership. General Mladic and the General Staff of the Serb republic army spoke very clearly in favor of supporting the Serbian republic leadership," Krajisnik says.

According to the chairman of the Serbian republic assembly, Prime Minister-Designate Dusan Kovic has prepared the introductory speech for the forthcoming Assembly session that is based on measures undertaken by the current government in the past 10 days. Krajisnik did not wish to comment on the makeup of the new cabinet.

"The preparations for the forthcoming referendum on the contact group plan are coming to an end without problems or delays. Ballots have already been printed and will be distributed throughout the Serbian republic after the Assembly session," Krajisnik added.

Sarajevo Sets Deadline for Abdic's Surrender

AU1708153194 Paris AFP in English 1448 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Text] Zagreb, Aug 17 (AFP)—Bosnian Government troops in the Bihac enclave Wednesday [17 August] set a seven-day deadline for forces of Moslem rebel leader Fikret Abdic to surrender, a UN spokesman told AFP.

The army of the Moslem-led government has recaptured more than 80 percent of the enclave in northwest Bosnia.

Major Jean-Francois Philippe of the 3rd French UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] battalion deployed in the enclave said representatives of the 5th Bosnian Army Corps made the demand in a meeting with Abdic aides at Coralici, between Bihac and Velika Kladusa, an Abdic stronghold.

The two sides will meet again at Velika Kladusa Sunday [21 August], the spokesman for the United Nations Protection Force said.

HVO Commander Denies Abdic's Claims

AU1708185594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Excerpt] In a telephone conversation with our Zagreb correspondent, Nada al-Isa, Colonel Franjo (?Grgic), commander of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] of Bihac, denied the false accusations of Fikret Abdic's propaganda machine that the Bihac HVO is subordinated to Abdic's paramilitary forces and that they will even fight on their side.

[Begin Al-Isa recording] The Bihac HVO and the 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina are jointly defending Bihac [word indistinct] against the chetniks. They have been (?cooperating for three years), since the beginning of the war. This has been stated by Colonel Franjo (?Grgic), commander of the Bihac HVO, in a telephone conversation with us. In this way the colonel wanted to deny the false statements by the self-proclaimed leaders of the so- called autonomous province of western Bosnia, who have been making statements on Croatian Television that the HVO (?is subordinated) to Fikret Abdic's forces, and that there is even a written agreement on this. [passage omitted] [end recording]

UN: Army Consolidates Positions Around Vares

AU1708150594 Paris AFP in English 1405 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, Aug 17 (AFP)—The UN Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, grappling with challenges from both rebel Bosnian Serbs and the mainly Moslem government, complained Wednesday [17 August] of "blackmail" from Serbs desperate for fuel supplies. [passage omitted]

UN officials also said Wednesday they were taking very seriously a new call to arms by the head of the government army, General Rasim Delic. [passage omitted]

"The Bosnian Army is legally liberating territories temporarily occupied by the Serbs," Delic said. "We are now entering the offensive stage of our defense but (...) will need to create some conditions, primarily (better) equipment.

"It is not pure rhetoric," said one senior UN official who did not wish to be named.

Annink confirmed Wednesday that the Bosnian offensive was continuing, especially around Vares and Olovo to the north and north-east of Sarajevo, and said there had been artillery exchanges within the exclusion zone where heavy arms are meant to be under UN control.

Serb forces had set up two tanks near Breza to the northwest of the capital Sarajevo, in flagrant violation of the exclusion zone, he continued.

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A UNPROFOR official said government troops had made further advances in the Vares region and had consolidated a front which gave them control over a strategic road.

Annink said he did not wish to comment on the general's call but agreed that it did not "help the mission of the UN nor the task of Mr. Akashi."

"UNPROFOR will react to actions on the ground and we have clearly seen the offensive actions of the Bosnian Army over the last few days and weeks," he added, without giving details of what steps the UN forces could take. [passage omitted]

Government, Serbs Exchange 27 Prisoners of War

AU1708193394 Paris AFP in English 1901 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Aug 17 (AFP)—Bosnian Government and separatist Serb authorities freed 27 prisoners of war Wednesday [17 August] in Sarajevo in the third such exchange under an accord signed in June.

Watched by a press contingent, Sarajevo authorities released 13 prisoners and Bosnian Serbs 14 on the Fraternity and Unity bridge in the centre of the city. The exchange had twice been postponed.

The UN-guarded bridge is the only access route between Serb- and Bosnian Government-held areas of Sarajevo.

Some of the Bosnian prisoners freed had been held since the start of the war in the republic in April 1992.

A total of 1,000 prisoners—500 on each side—are to be freed under the accord. Twenty-two detainees were freed in the two previous exchanges to date.

The Bosnian Serbs, who want all prisoners freed en masse, have linked their dissatisfaction at the way the exchanges have progressed to other issues—notably their decision to close off at the end of July the last two safe civilian routes out of the city, thereby reimposing the blockade of Sarajevo they had lifted in March.

Serbs Deny Blocking UN Aid Convoys

LD1708184894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1833 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Text] Belgrade, Aug. 17 (TANJUG)—There were conflicting reports Wednesday about a claimed plan to blockade of humanitarian aid convoys passing through Bosnian Serb territory.

Bosnian Serb sources denied a REUTER news agency report Wednesday that convoys crossing Bosnian Serb territory would have to pay for their passage in fuel.

REUTER had quoted U.N. Spokesman Rob Annink as saying "the Bosnian Serb army (BSA) command has informed us that no convoys will be approved from the 18th of August unless fuel is given out to BSA checkpoints and forces along the road."

Chairman of the Bosnian Serb Committee for Humanitarian Aid, Dragan Kekic, on Wednesday disputed the report, telling the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA that there had been no restrictions imposed on the passage of international humanitarian aid.

Kekic said rules for convoys were being relaxed and said a decision to assist aid convoys had been taken Tuesday night by the Bosnian Serb government. Kekic said a schedule had already been approved for the movement of convoys next week.

SRNA quoted a U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees office source on Wednesday as saying convoys to Muslim enclaves were crossing freely through Bosnian Serb territory.

UNHCR spokeswoman in Belgrade Yoko Nishimura was quoted by SRNA as confirming that a U.N. convoy of 88 tons of food and cleansers had been given free passage through Bosnian Serb territory on Wednesday.

Nishimura said one tanker containing 5.5 tons of oil for the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica was held up at the Karakaj border crossing, SRNA reported.

SRNA quoted Nishimura as saying the Bosnian Serb governmemt had denied passage for the tanker and the Yugoslav government had denied it the right to return to Yugoslav territory.

The Bosnian Serb government has reported that there were about 3,000 humanitarian aid convoys in the first six months of 1994, of which about one fourth were destined for Bosnian Serbs.

Obstacles to Evacuation of Serbs Overcome

LD1808093794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0853 GMT 18 Aug 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, Aug. 18 (TANJUG)—The last obstacle for the evacuation of 200 Serb civilians from the Muslim part of Sarajevo to Bosnian Serb-controlled territories has been overcome.

The departure of the convoy is scheduled for August 25, Bosnian Serb agency SRNA cited the headquarters for helping Serbs in Sarajevo as saying.

The Serb side will at the same time secure the passage over its territory in the direction Ilidza-Kiseljak for 250 Muslim children who will go from the Sarajevo suburb of Hrasnica to the Croatian seaside, SRNA said.

'Terror' Against Banja Luka Muslims Reported

AU1708193894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Text] The terror against the Bosniaks has been stepped up in Banja Luka and the surrounding region. Unprecedented crimes against them are also being committed by

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the Serbs from Zenica, Travnik, Tuzla, and other towns and free parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina who have moved to Banja Luka through the exchange of civilians. Males between 18 and 65 years of age, and even women and children, are being brutally compelled to do forced labor. Recently, the Bosniaks were forced to dig trenches on the front lines on the Brcko, Orasje, Doboj, and Donji Vakuf fronts. All this is happening in front of the local officials of the International Red Cross and the UNHCR.

According to information from the Citizens' Anti-Fascist Association of Banja Luka, [words indistinct] August this year, two policemen raided [word indistinct] in Gornji Seher and mistreated people during prayers. They forced them to throw away their (?prayer books) and other [word indistinct], and told them that next time they would kill them if they appeared in the [word indistinct] again. One of the policemen is called Milan Maglov. He is known for the terror that he has been conducting in Gornji Seher, which the Banja Luka authorities have renamed Srpske Toplice.

The terror against the non-Serb population is also being spurred on by public statements by representatives of the authorities, who are denying the right of the Bosniaks who fled Banja Luka to return to their town. Four days ago, the well-known criminal Radovan Brdjanin threatened the Muslims and Croats on local television, saying that cohabitation with them is impossible and that they should be fenced off behind barbed wire, and especially the Muslims, because they are polluting the town.

Lack of Security Postpones Croat-Muslim Talks

LD1708155194 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Text] The scheduled talks between the higest-ranking representatives of the Croat Democratic Union [HDZ] of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the [Muslim] Party of Democratic Action have not been held. Zdenko Vranjes reports from Mostar on the reasons why.

[Vranjes] The talks were to be held in Hrasnica near Sarajevo. A six-member HDZ delegation, headed by party chairman Dario Kordic, left Mostar for Hrasnica this morning. However, at the crossing point to the territory under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in Kolacini near Mostar, the police patrol of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Ministry of Interior, which was to escort the delegation to Hrasnica, failed to turn up. After three hours of waiting, the HDZ delegation gave up and returned to Mostar.

The chairman of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina said that no political importance should be ascribed to this event. Kordic added that he expects that the talks between the leaders of the two largest parties in the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation will be held soon.

The two delegations were to discuss the implementation of the Washington agreement. The initiative for the interparty talks was launched by the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina several weeks ago, in order to speed up, in that way as well, the process of building the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation and its confederation with the Republic of Croatia.

Serb General in Bosnian Army Interviewed

94BA0380A Belgrade SRPSKA REC in Serbo-Croatian 1 Aug 94 pp 28-29

[Interview with Jovan Divjak, general in the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Aleksandar Cotric in Sarajevo on 12 July: "Topical Interview: One of Alija's Serbs From No. 8 JNA Street"]

[Text] General Jovan Divjak, deputy commander of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina [ABH], is a Serb born in Belgrade. Gen. Divjak is one of the most popular figures in Sarajevo. People there call him General Courage, "an officer and a gentleman," and songs are even sung about him: "Commander Jovo, you are like a brother to us, we have been waging the war for freedom since April." Before war broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jovan Divjak was a colonel in the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]. In 1992, a JNA military tribunal sentenced him to nine months in prison and two years suspended because he allowed the Territorial Defense [TO] in Kiseljak to take weapons from the warehouse guarded by the Yugoslav Army.

Divjak has been living in Sarajevo for 28 years now. His wife is a Muslim.

His friends and colleagues say of him that he is one of the rare officers of the former JNA, and now of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who is ready to get down to the level of the ordinary soldier, to solve the problems of soldiers and to help them as much as he can. It is said that they have all been cordially received in his office. His moving about the city alone, without a single bodyguard, also certainly helps to make him a favorite. Once, the people of Sarajevo say, "their Jovo" returned to the city after a three-month stay in the field. It took him more than an hour to get from the building of the Presidium of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Eternal Fire, which is not more than a few hundred meters. Everyone stopped him, congratulated him, kissed him. Passersby begged him never to leave Sarajevo again, because they are "much safer when he is in the city."

KOS [Counterintelligence Service] Is Still in the Saddle

Gen. Divjak's comrades in arms say of him that he has directly participated in all the decisive battles for defense of the city. The general of the "Muslim army" (as reporters of Radio-TV Serbia [RTS] would say) does not conceal his Serbian nationality. On the contrary, he still speaks ekavian, is active in the Serbian Civil Council, and is protecting the rights of the Serbs whom the authorities or bandit groups have been imprisoning, firing from their jobs, and evicting from their apartments.

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[Cotric] Given the choice between the JNA and the TO of Bosnia-Herzegovina, why did you choose the latter military formation?

[Divjak] I was not choosing between military formations, but between conceptions of the future arrangement of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The JNA placed itself at the service of expansionist Serbian nationalism. Seven corps of the JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina openly went over to the side of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] extremists. They occupied all the most important strategic points and prepared for a war against citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In recent years, before the war broke out, the JNA had become virtually monoethnic. Of the 16 generals in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 13 were Serbs, one a Muslim, one a Montenegrin, and one a Croat. As early as January and February 1992 the JNA had distributed weapons to the Serbian population.

All of this influenced me in choosing the civil option instead of the ethnic option. And for that matter, Bosnia was recognized by the United Nations as a sovereign state. I was offered the post of deputy commander of the TO of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which I accepted, because the TO was multiethnic.

[Cotric] Has the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina retained its multiethnic character?

[Divjak] Yes, although there are fewer and fewer Serbs and Croats in its ranks. Ivan Siber, Army deputy commander, is a Croat, and I am a Serb. Even today there are units in which the Serbs and Croats each represent 25 percent. However, the reaction to the remarks of the Muslim extremists has not been appropriate in the Army. I receive reports that three or four Serbian families disappear in a single day, or that five, 10, or 15 Serbs have been killed. Armed groups are maintaining terror in the city, and evictions of Serbs from their apartments have become more frequent. Members of the SDA [Democratic Action Party] and former members of KOS, who spent the war in cellars, are taking up all the positions of leadership in the Army. The SDS is now trying to create a one-party army, and the former KOS-ites have the last word.

At one time, there were 17 percent Croats and 12 percent Serbs on the staff of the Supreme Command, but today they are only 1 percent. Until a year ago there were also two brigades in which the Serbs were a majority, but that is not the case today, because suspicion of them has grown. I must say that there is no distrust in the ordinary soldiers and officers at the lower level. The brigade commanders are the ones who do not trust the Serbs.

There are increasingly frequent cases when Serbs in the ranks of the Army are going over to the other side. The reason for that is the general situation in Sarajevo, but also the creation of the Muslim-Croatian federation; since then the Serbs have been pushed to one side, above all because of the behavior of the Croats.

At present, the Serbs represent 3 percent in the Army.

When it comes to ethnic representation, the situation is much better in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where the Serbs represent 17 percent.

"Friends" and War Booty

[Cotric] What is the situation at the front? News is coming in that the Army is undertaking offensive actions on certain fronts.

[Divjak] The embargo has had an exceeding impact on the armament of the TO, later the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. All the weapons of the JNA remained in the hands of the Serbian rebels. The Croats were armed through their allies abroad.

The Army has remained without heavy armament of any quality. From the first days of the war right up until today the problem has been in the balance. The ratio between the Serbs and us in heavy armament is three to one in their favor. I will just give you some examples. They have 350 tanks and we have 50. They have 5,000 artillery barrels and we 1,000. They have an air force and missile systems and we do not have that at all. They have 150 tanks in the Sarajevo area, but we have only two.

It is important, however, that regardless of the technical aid to the enemy our fighters have been putting up a very successful defense. Along the lines of contact, then, it is not realistic to expect any significant change.

[Cotric] Do you anticipate new offensives of the Army under command of Gen. Mladic?

[Divjak] The aggressor's tendency is to continue actions toward Bihac. His objective is to keep Sarajevo surrounded. And in spite of the ban, the enemy is keeping 140 heavy guns in the vicinity of Sarajevo.

If the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] does not frustrate their intentions, the main thrust will be toward Ivan-Sedlo via Bjelasnica and with Vlasic toward Travnik. Group Seven, which is offensive, plans to take Zavidovici, Tesanj, and Maglaj.

[Cotric] Are the NATO ultimatums and the last cease-fire signed in Geneva being respected?

[Divjak] The fact is that the cease-fire has not been respected. Since the NATO ultimatum on 21 February, 45 people have been killed in Sarajevo, and more than 200 wounded. Yesterday (11 July), the enemy seized several cannon and howitzers in the Cekrikici District which were under control of the UNPROFOR. In the protected zone of Sarajevo, the enemy has no problems moving its tanks from one place to another. All of this is occurring with the blessing of the UNPROFOR. There have even been cases when the Serbs took more favorable positions than they had before the ultimatum. At some places they have approached to within a few dozen meters of our positions, because we were not allowed to open fire.

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[Cotric] How are your units obtaining weapons?

[Divjak] There are several ways in which we are obtaining the necessary armament. First of all, there is war booty. And then we have gotten the factories running in Travnik, Zenica, and Vitez, which are once again producing armament and ammunition. However, difficulties in obtaining production supplies are a big problem for us. In addition, we have been getting a supply of weapons through secret channels from our friends in the outside world. From the beginning of 1993 until recently the Croats were stopping those convoys and taking the weapons. Now we are forced to buy from the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] weapons which were sent to us. Nevertheless, I must say that this is not enough, because only one out of every three conscripts has a light infantry weapon.

[Cotric] What are the relations now between the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO?

[Divjak] There are no conflicts whatsoever between HVO Commanders Rosa and Petkovic and Army Commander Delic. However, there are extremists in the field who do not accept the cease-fire, or creation of the Muslim-Croatian federation. They are still waging certain wars of their own and attacking the humanitarian convoys and robbing civilians.

The situation is especially unfavorable in the area of Bugojno and Prozor. There, the situation is very fluid and there could be open conflicts at any moment.

Nevertheless, in any case we now have one less enemy. The Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina have not been in conflict with the Serbs at all for the last year and a half.

Tito Remains Relevant

[Cotric] You mentioned that in spite of the embargo you have been getting arms "through secret channels from friendly countries." Can you tell us what countries those are?

[Divjak] I am sorry to say that I cannot tell you that!

[Cotric] It is thought in Serbia that your Army has not achieved a single military success in two years of warfare. What do you say to that?

[Divjak] The military exploits of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina are numerous. The most important are the defense of Sarajevo, Zepa, Srebrenica, Gorazde, Mostar, the Sava Valley, Celici, Teocak, Kladanj, Olovo, Maglaj, Tesanj, Bihac....

The Army is now well-organized, it is functioning well in spite of quite significant difficulties in communications. The fighters have an extremely high morale, although only a third of them are armed.

Great attention is being paid to training the officer corps. In Sarajevo, we have established a wartime officer school. In all the corps, the fighters are taking military training courses.

[Cotric] The JNA was an idealized army, a party army. Has the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina been deideologized and freed from party influence?

[Divjak] Such an army does not exist anywhere in the world!

[Cotric] What do you think about Gen. Mladic, commander of the Army of the Srpska republic?

[Divjak] Mladic is an altogether mediocre officer. He approaches head-on, he attacks the cities directly instead of skirting them and taking new territory. With the number of weapons he possessed, had he the knowledge, he could have broken through to the sea in seven days and occupied all of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Cotric] You are a member of the Serbian Civil Council. Why?

[Divjak] We Serbs are in a much more difficult position than the Muslims and Croats. In the federation, they have both the church and the army with them. We have nothing. We neither have a voice, nor are we well-organized. For example, the Croats, you see, have the Croatian Defense Council and the powerful Catholic Church. They dictated the terms of the agreement with the Muslims. We have been betrayed both by the Serbian state and the Serbian church. Here in Sarajevo alone live 60,000 Serbs whom the propaganda from Belgrade and Pale refers to pejoratively as ASes (Alija's Serbs).

The Serbian Civil Council is in favor of a unified, multiethnic, and civil Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time, the Serbian Civil Council strives to protect the rights of the Serbs living on territories controlled by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

That is why I sincerely support that organization.

[Cotric] Are you satisfied with the status of the Serbian people in the federation?

[Divjak] I am not satisfied because in the constitution of the federation the Serbs are defined as "others." Representatives of the Serbs ought to be on negotiating teams and should represent the authentic interests of Bosnian Serbs. In the Army itself, those who are taking over more and more are exclusively those who find me bothersome. That is why I have offered Alija Izetbegovic my resignation.

* * *

When we switched to the unofficial part of the interview, I had an occasion to look around Gen. Divjak's office. A few centimeters above his head there was a visible trace of a sniper bullet. The general had circled that place with a red pencil and written: 20 December 1992, 2212 hours. On the wall, there was a photograph of Josip Broz, and on the desk a miniature plaster bust of the former commander in chief of the JNA.

As I was leaving the building of the Supreme Command of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, my attention was caught by the street sign. It said: No. 8 JNA Street (?!).

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Refugee Association Ends Blockade of UN Troops

LD1708161594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1604 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Text] Zagreb, Aug. 17 (TANJUG)—Representatives of the Association of Croatian Refugees said Wednesday that they had ended a blockade of the United Nations Protection Force [UNPROFOR], mounted on July 1.

The association threatened with another blockade unless their requests were met by mid-September.

Speaking at an UNPROFOR check-point in Nemetin near Osijek in eastern Slavonia, the refugee representatives told reporters that the blockade had been lifted on 18 U.N. check-points and that only one more had still been blocked in Lika.

The U.N. Security Council last week lodged a strong protest with Croatian authorities against their supporting and helping the blockade, which had prevented U.N. peacekeepers from effectively monitoring the separation line between Serb Krajina and Croatia.

The Croatian Refugees Association threatened to mount a "total blockade" of the U.N. check-points and logistics centers if UNPROFOR failed to meet its demands. The association also announced a possibility of "other kinds of pressure on the U.N."

The association requested that conditions be created for the Croatian refugees to return to their homes in the U.N. protected area in the Serb Krajina and that U.N. troops enable Croatia to establish its rule there.

The association said the United Nations must publish "a pilot refugee return program" by late August and begin implementing it in mid-September.

The association called for the Croatian Government not to agree in present conditions to extend UNPROFOR mandate which expires on September 30.

Serbs in Croatia declared the independent republic of Serb Krajina in 1991 after Croatia seceded from the former Yugoslav federation and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian Constitution.

The territory was placed under U.N. protection in March 1992.

Bosnian Serbs Fire 2 Shells at Dubrovnik Airport

LD1808093394 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 18 Aug 94

[Text] At 0612 and 0623, the Bosnian Serbs fired two cannon shells from the occupied part of Bosnia-Herzegovina at Cilipe airport, The Interior Ministry has announced. Dubrovnik airport is open for traffic and a regular plane for Zagreb took off this morning, officials at the airport have said.

Inconsistencies of UN Mandate Viewed

94BA0383B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 26 Jul 94 pp 20-21

[Article by Boris Komadina: "Mandate of the Absurd"]

[Text] *Serbian representatives claim that there are 500,000 people living in the occupied parts of Croatia, but demographers think that that number should not be any higher than 150,000. If a humanitarian assistance plan had been prepared in accordance with that calculation, it is believed that the number of convoys would have been cut at least in half.*

When Serbian terrorists mined part of the railroad near Pakrac half a year ago, the Interior Ministry's inspection team found on the scene several cans with meat from France and a box of biscuits, also from France. Both the cans and the biscuits bore clear markings that confirmed that they originated from the humanitarian assistance that arrives in Croatia every day. Not too much attention was paid to displaced persons' warnings that this case only confirmed their old thesis that the army of the rebel Serbs in the occupied parts of Croatia was being fed precisely through humanitarian assistance.

The protests throughout Croatia that have been organized by the displaced persons themselves, although disputed by the government, show the dual role of the Protection Force in Croatia. The blockade of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] monitoring stations and the prevention of the transportation of oil derivatives and other goods in short supply from the free part of Croatia to the occupied one exposed the "course of normal life in the Krajina." That is not even concealed by the Serbian media in the UNPA [UN Protected Area] areas. Local leader Dusan Vitez spoke out through the Serbian Radio of Okucani, and criticized UNPROFOR's ineffectiveness and demanded as an ultimatum that it "break through the Croatian blockade by force." It is now clear that the Serbs lack a great deal of what they have been supplied so far by the UN peacekeeping forces, smuggling goods from the free parts of Croatia. In Baranja and eastern Slavonia, harvesting machines have come to a halt because of a lack of motor fuel. The latest trend pointed out by the Community of Displaced Persons is obvious. Specifically, convoys of UN vehicles cross from Croatia into Hungary, and from there to the occupied areas, and at the Donji Miholjac border crossing, the head of the convoy shows the approval from the Croatian authorities that they have the right to transport goods to a "third country" (!?). The Community of Displaced Persons is publicly asking: "Why are the occupied areas of Croatia classified as third countries?"

Manipulation of Figures

The blockade of the monitoring stations also raised several other issues that have never been fully clarified. Why is it that to this very day there has never been an official document, a census of the population residing in the occupied areas, and certified by the UN? The manipulation of the figures that are so frequently mentioned (even in the

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Assembly, by Djukic, for example), that 350,000 or even more people live in the occupied areas, leaves room for the smuggling of goods. Humanitarian requirements are also determined in accordance with the number of inhabitants. How far that manipulation of the figures has gone is also shown by the case of the self-styled Minister Jarcevic, who publicly (in Geneva) claims that 500,000 people are living in the occupied areas. Demographers think that the number of inhabitants there could not be any higher than 150,000. If the humanitarian aid plan had been prepared in accordance with that calculation, it is believed that the number of convoys (today about 10 a day) would have been at least cut in half.

The ineffectiveness and total impotence of the "Blue Helmets" in Croatia have reached their peak in recent months. Furthermore, the scope of the effectiveness of UNPROFOR has been declining rapidly in recent months. Even some previous ideas about an improvement of the situation in the UNPA's, for example in Sector West, are no longer current. After the departure of Fischer, the coordinator for civil affairs, all the ideas and initiatives were simply frozen. By signing the Zagreb agreement, Croatia has entered a paradoxical situation in which the number of displaced persons has increased, because the Croatian Army has withdrawn from the zone of separation. People from villages in the zone of separation simply "withdrew" along with the army. Not even Resolution 769, according to which UNPROFOR was supposed to monitor the internationally recognized borders, was ever carried out. The "Blue Helmets'" explanation was that "they did not have enough strength." A team of Croatian experts drafted and offered to UNPROFOR a proposal which shows that the border could be monitored if 25 members of the peacekeeping forces were deployed at each of 16 monitoring posts. That is a total of 400 soldiers, which is a drop in the buck for the 12,000 "Blue Helmets" currently in this region. No answer of any kind, even a verbal one, was ever received in response to this proposal, which took several months to prepare.

"We Are Not Authorized"

With its spread to other areas of the former Yugoslavia, UNPROFOR's main headquarters for Croatia has virtually ceased to exist. Admittedly, it exists on paper, but in practice no constructive agreement was possible because the UN officers for Croatia cite their superiors, who are impossible to "catch." The main UN headquarters provided for by Resolution 871 was simply never implemented. The expression "We do not have the strength," which became the trademark of UNPROFOR in Croatia, is constantly repeated. Point 9 of Resolution 871 is very precise. It clearly states that UNPROFOR can use force if the safety and freedom of movement of its soldiers are threatened. Consequently, they cannot be restricted by anything within the UNPA areas. Consequently, if it were not tragic, their pathetic sigh, "We cannot get to this or that village," would be funny, to say the least. Unfortunately, it is also an integral part of UNPROFOR's mandate of the absurd.

Successes of Croatian Air Defense Viewed

94BA0385A Zagreb HRVATSKI VOJNIK in Serbo-Croatian 28 Jan 94 pp 84-85

[Article by Vinko Sebrek: "Ceremony at Pleso"]

[Text] *The anniversary celebration for Pleso Air Base was also an opportunity to reflect on the successes of the HRZ [Croatian Air Force] and PZO [Air Defense] achieved over the past year.*

On 23 December 1993, members of the Pleso Air Base celebrated the second anniversary of its existence and successful operation. The rich program of activities, which aside from the now-customary military ceremony and cultural-entertainment events also included a flight program, will remain indelibly etched in the memory of not only the members of this unit, but also of the many invitees and guests. It was a real holiday for the eyes and soul. With fantastic bravura in their MiG-21 fighters, pilots Captain Danijel Borovic and Captain Ivan Selak demonstrated top-notch training, high psychophysical conditioning and abilities, knowledge, and skill, and not only their own, but also the training level of their colleagues—the pilots of the fighter squadron.

The unit's day was an opportunity to show how much has been achieved in the combat, technical, and overall training of aviation units over the course of the year.

This was also a sort of promotion for the HRZ and PZO, especially for the pilot vocation, before the broader Croatian public, because the program was covered by the media.

Through the pilots' irreproachable flying even at the lowest permitted altitude, their acrobatics even with the greatest load on the aircraft, and their psychophysical exertions, they provided an annual assessment not only of the pilots, but also of the HRZ and PZO in their entirety, an assessment marked by work and moral qualities, knowledge, and enthusiasm in mastering and applying modern aviation technology and training the numerous members of the HRZ, from privates to the highest-ranking officials.

This anniversary is an opportunity to recall the beginnings of the creation and coming of age of this unit.

The commander of the air base, Colonel Zdenko Radulj, talked about those days in his welcoming speech, saying this, among other things:

"Two years ago, or on 25 December 1991 to be precise, the raising of the Croatian flag at the entrance to the Pleso barracks signified the beginning of work to create a new HV [Croatian Armed Forces] air base. That is an important date for us and for the history of the HRZ.

"Pleso Airfield was very important to the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], and negotiations surrounding its transfer were extremely difficult and protracted. Although an agreement on the transfer of Pleso Airfield

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was reached between the government of the RH [Republic of Croatia] and representatives of the former JA [Yugoslav Army] as early as 22 November 1991, the actual transfer did not take place immediately. The representatives of the former JA not only failed to live up to the agreed details, but also destroyed material property in the interim. The stipulated disarming of the mine fields was not performed entirely, and the mining and demolition plans were not handed over. They devastated the majority of the office equipment and installations at the airfield, destroyed all the vehicles that they did not take with them, and set up booby traps. Even a year and a half later, we discovered explosive mine devices. Our pyrotechnicians removed and disarmed more than 16 metric tons of explosives from mine devices. There is no need to say anything about the infamy and criminal intentions of the former JA even after their departure.

"The situation in the Republic of Croatia at that time made it necessary to hastily get the air base in an operative state. The specified number of people was mobilized and people with specialized training who had previously been at the front line of battle began to be brought in to the air base. With minimal resources and in an exceptionally short period of time, the Pleso air base was made capable of performing basic organizational tasks.

"Organized flights began as well on 11 February 1992 with the landing of a MiG-21, the first HV aircraft at the Pleso Airfield. Although the airspace of the Republic of Croatia was still closed and we did not have all the necessary ordnance, we conducted all the necessary missions with that aircraft relating to flight training for systems to protect the airspace. Military operations were still going on in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, and the use of such warplanes was increasingly necessary. If we had taken over the Pleso air base earlier, the first defector from the former Yugoslav air force, Major Rudolf Peresin, would have landed his MiG-21 at our airfield.

"Through the defection and landing at Croatian airfields of two more MiG-21's in May 1992, the gathering and assembly of parts for several more warplanes, and the acquisition of new technical aviation equipment, the Pleso air base grew into a strong unit ready to perform all tasks required of it in the defense and liberation of the occupied parts of the Republic of Croatia."

In his inspired address to those present, Col. Radulj dwelled in particular on the creative enthusiasm of members of the unit, who are not shaken by the miserable working conditions, who want to give even more, which requires the creation of the necessary conditions for that. Also emphasized were new obligations and duties which time and the situation demand of pilots and other air personnel, but also the guarantee that aircraft will provide full fire support to units of the HV and protect the airspace and territory of the Republic of Croatia.

"With current aviation resources, airplanes, and helicopters, with highly trained and motivated pilots and technical staff, the Pleso air base is becoming the backbone of the HRZ in performing missions in the defense of the RH," he said in conclusion. In welcoming those present, the commander of the HRZ and PZO, Brigadier General Imra Agotic, picturesquely described the creation and coming of age of the HRZ and PZO as an important aspect of the HV, based on the example of this important unit.

"During the course of the year," Gen. Agotic emphasized, "other units have had anniversary celebrations with presentations of air systems, their progress and major step forward in organization, research, personnel reinforcement, and unit training. From those celebrations and the one today, it is obvious that today Croatia has a high-profile aviation structure through air units and institutions, i.e., command posts, and that it constitutes a strong force of the HV and of Croatian defense."

"Under conditions of relative privation, such results could be achieved only through increased work and responsibility, top-notch creativity, enthusiasm, and incessant training. That is why I am taking the opportunity to thank you for your exertions and achieved results, with the wish that these results and success be for you a stimulus for even greater exertions in carrying out the responsible tasks that await us in the coming period," Gen. Agotic said in conclusion.

It is precisely upon its anniversary that the Pleso air base is being restructured into a modern combat air unit, aware of its place, role, and duty in our republic's defense and protection structure. Restructuring to the standards of modern aviation requires a great deal of work and training, as well as modern technology that must be mastered and put into operation quickly.

It is no secret that in developing its air force our country has opted for Western technology, the desire being to not lag behind the most modern air forces in Europe and the world in any sense. It is known that international political and military factors are blocking that effort right now, but precisely that necessitates a top-notch level of training on the existing technology in order that the transition to the new technology be as short as possible. If the noted facts are considered, the obligations and duties facing this unit and the entire HRZ in the coming period are clear. Complex tasks in developing and strengthening our air force can be carried out successfully only by versatile personnel, armed with desire, know-how, and enthusiasm.

Judging from what we saw on that beautiful winter day at Pleso Airfield, in the wonderful bravura and top-rate piloting technique of pilots Danijel Borovic and Ivan Selak, the suggestion is that all the requirements being set out will also be met. The know-how and skill that they demonstrated in their steel birds are a success, but also the wish of all aviators.

The high degree of trust placed in this unit is at the same time a big challenge. It is also the nicest birthday wish.

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Federal

Deputy Prime Minister Meets EU Mission Chief

LD1708202294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2009 GMT 17 Aug 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, Aug. 17 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Zeljko Simic said here Wednesday that Yugoslavia's consistent peaceful orientation must result in a lifting of U.N. sanctions. It must also result in a return of its legitimate place in international affairs, he said.

Simic met with the new chief of the European Union monitoring mission, Paul Joachim Stuelpnagel and the German Embassy Charge d'Affaires, Gerhard Enver Schromgens.

Simic said Yugoslavia would continue its policy of peace and would invest efforts towards a lasting peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a political solution acceptable to all Bosnian warring sides.

The United Nations Security Council in May 1992 imposed strict economic sanctions against the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro because of its alleged involvement in the Bosnian war waged among the local Muslims, Serbs and Croats.

A statement by the Yugoslav Information Ministry said Simic had informed the visitors about the principled stands of the Yugoslav Government and all key political factors in Yugoslavia.

Simic said that all the horrors of war in Bosnia must stop and that peace was the greatest goal and the greatest blessing of all peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the statement said.

Simic voiced hope that the international community would exert its influence to effect an observation of the ceasefire and to stop all military operations of the Bosnian Muslims.

Simic said proved violations of the U.N. arms embargo (on the former Yugoslavia) in favor of the Bosnian Muslims on one hand, and groundless allegations against Yugoslavia on the other, were conducive to a further destabilization of the entire Balkans.

The meeting also focused on current relations between the republic of Serb Krajina and Croatia.

Both sides assessed that negotiating and diplomatic processes placed on an equal footing should be encouraged and strengthened as the only way towards finding solutions that would be in line with the political reality and the one in the field.

Serbs in Croatia declared the independent republic of Serb Krajina in 1991, after Croatia seceded from the former Yugoslav Federation and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian Constitution.

Ministry Concern for Russian Rights in Baltic

LD1708174594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1710 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Text] Belgrade, Aug. 17 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement Wednesday expressing concern about the rights of Russians living in Estonia and Latvia.

The statement said rights of Russians in Estonia and Latvia "are not only far below the standards guaranteed by relevant Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe principles and norms, but are ignored and even threatened in certain elementary forms." If the situation countinued it would be "contrary to CSCE principles and goals and harmful to stability and peace in this important part of Europe," said the statement.

The Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs appealed to the Governments of Estonia and Latvia to take "appropriate measures to fulfil the commitments they have assumed as newly admitted CSCE participating states," said the statement.

The statement supported Russia's efforts to "overcome the outstanding issues in its relations with these states through negotiations, on the basis of good-neighborliness and in the interest of stability in Europe and full respect for the universally accepted international human rights standards."

The ministry statement said Yugoslavia had been obliged to take a public stand on the issue of the rights of Russians in Estonia and Latvia because it was unable to present its position directly at the CSCE.

Yugoslavia was suspended from participating in CSCE bodies in 1992 after the United Nations imposed sanctions on the country for what was alleged to be Yugoslav involvement in the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Serbia

SPO Wants Blockade of Bosnian Serbs Lifted

AU1708160594 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Aug 94 p 4

[Report by C. Milivojevic: "Milosevic Is Taking His Anger Out on the Serbian Poor"]

[Excerpt] Belgrade—The Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO] is demanding the lifting of the blockade of the unjustified sanctions with which Slobodan Milosevic has been taking out his anger on the Serbian poor who live on the other side of the Drina. This was said by Milan Komnenic, chairman of the SPO Executive Committee, at yesterday's news conference.

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Apart from this enormous damage to the inner Serbian arena, the president of Serbia, according to Komnenic, has enhanced that damage on the international scene by refusing to allow international observers on the Drina, even though it was clear that this would be the next demand by the international community, following the blockade on the Drina.

These moves of Milosevic's are most certainly not going to increase the credibility of the Serbian negotiating side in the world. With this move, the Serbian president has injured the patriotic and human feelings of the Serbian nation which, under Milan Nedic [Serbian quisling prime minister during World War II], fed dozens of thousands of Slovenes and is now halting "aid" to its brothers in Bosnia, Milan Komnenic said, adding that the petition for the extraordinary session of the Serbian People's Assembly was almost complete. [passage omitted]

Radica! Party Leader on Assembly Incident

94BA0380B Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 29 Jul 94 pp 14-15

[Interview with Tomislav Nikolic, people's deputy, head of the Radical caucus in the Serbian Assembly, by Marijana Milosavljevic; place and date not given: "With Life at Stake"]

[Text] Mr. Tomislav Nikolic, who heads the Radical caucus, looks quite good after last week's incident in the Serbian Assembly. When I told him that, he showed me the black-and-blue marks still visible above his elbows and up toward the shoulders, and he said there were still more under his shirt. "It is not all as harmless as viewers of Radio-TV Serbia [RTS] think," he said reflectively, and then he recalled for NIN: "As soon as I mentioned Mirjana Markovic, the president jumped as though he had been scalded, ran from the chamber, came back, again took the floor away from me, again called a recess. Under Article 74, Paragraph 2, of the Rules, no one has the right to deny a deputy the freedom of speech. Nowhere in law and nowhere in the Constitution does it say that if a deputy refuses to leave the chamber, the police should rush in, beat the deputy, and carry him from the chamber entire or in pieces. All I did was mention Mirjana Markovic, chief ideologue of the League of Communists—Movement for Yugoslavia [SK-PJ], and now already of some JUL [United Yugoslav Left]. Our answer to that JUL is SUD [literally, court]. SUD could mean Serbian Moderate Right or Serbian United Right or Serbian Striking Right, and so SUD will render judgment on JUL."

He attempts to explain the politics of the incidents on which, in the judgment of many, the present policy of the SRS [Serbian Radical Party] is based. "There is something else you have to understand: The most dangerous thing for an opposition party and for its president is for no one to talk about them. The SRS is sometimes forced to provoke something outrageous so that it will be talked about, so that it will be written about, but," he adds, "not at any price. We did not want this kind of epilogue," Nikolic explains, "still less, obstruction of the proceedings of the parliament, which can serve Milosevic as an alibi for dissolving it. However, nothing could be better than for state television to attack us for anticommunism. I think in recent years the anticommunist segment of the electorate has had no one for whom to vote. Now all those people are turning to the Serbian Radical Party, which alone has the courage to point out the communism that is the rage, that is springing up like weeds."

[Milosavljevic] Let us go back to the event that made last week memorable. Where, in your opinion, did the special police appear from?

[Nikolic] The officers of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] came in the back door, where the deputies of the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement] come in. That means that they came in at the entrance on Popular Front Street, went through the basement and took the elevator, which is close to the medical room, bursar's office, and administrative office, and then reached the chamber down those stairs. They appeared suddenly in single file, in absolute silence. It had an eerie effect, all wearing those belts with pistols.

[Milosavljevic] In any case, they did not use the pistols, but why did they bring them?

[Nikolic] They know very well that the deputies leave their weapons at the entrance to the Assembly. I really do not understand how they could have thought that they would be at risk. Perhaps they figured that we would call up our sympathizers and members to surround the Assembly, so that then they would be armed and would defend themselves from inside the Assembly. I assume that that was their monstrous plan.

[Milosavljevic] How did the attack come about, how did it begin?

[Nikolic] The attack was horrible. While they were entering the chamber and deploying, they seemed to be mute, utterly calm in an absolutely complete silence. We heard the doors being locked, we heard someone banging on the outside and trying to enter, but that was impossible, because they had taken charge of all the doors. Then I told the head of security: "You are going to lose your job today. You will not be able to eject us, someone has set you up." He told me: "We will lose our jobs whether you get ejected or not. But we will still eject you, as a show of strength. We will do that if it costs us our lives."

[Milosavljevic] Was it perhaps only then that you realized how serious the situation was?

[Nikolic] I did not believe it, I thought he was trying to scare us. However, when they fell upon us and began to separate us and take us to different parts of the room, four on one, then I realized that they were not joking. In

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those 15 minutes or so, the time they had before the session began, they wanted to get us out and have the session resume.

[Milosavljevic] You made a statement that they attempted to choke you. Was this done by a member of Assembly security or one of the special police?

[Nikolic] At one point, one of the security people, I know the one, the same one who choked me, told me that after this he certainly would not be working with the police, but that he had another job and would also get a pension. And now, just imagine, if every member of the security who beat you up knows that he will get a pension for it, how many of them in the future are going to be ready to beat up the deputies!

[Milosavljevic] You know him personally, you know his full name?

[Nikolic] Yes, I do, but no, I am not going to make trouble for him. He knows very well, because when I came to, he put his head next to mine and we talked a bit that way. I know perfectly well who he is, but that is unimportant. As far as I am concerned, the matter is over and done with.

[Milosavljevic] Do you think that Dragan Tomic, president of the Assembly, personally sent in the security?

[Nikolic] I heard that when they were discussing the action in the Federal Assembly, Zoran Sokolovic, minister of internal affairs, offered his team, and the federal minister told him that that was impossible because the Federal Assembly is secured by the federal MUP. So, it is evident that Minister Sokolovic has a team that would react in such cases, and it follows that he unquestionably approved this action. However, it is quite certain that the president of the Assembly called the minister and requested the action.

[Milosavljevic] Some deputies made statements that same day that the entire affair had been precisely orchestrated, that it was not just a mere incident, but that it was an agreement your party was carrying out with the leadership of the Srpska republic. Is it possible to see this as a conflict between a lobby that is for peace with those who are for war?

[Nikolic] That is silly. We are not in any direct contact with anyone in Pale. For that matter, Mr. Djindjic has been boasting that he is in contact with them and that they are following his instructions. Our only contacts are public declarations that the Srpska republic should remain within the borders it now has and that the peace plan should be rejected in its entirety. We are not carrying out anyone's orders. And we ourselves are above all for peace. If anyone has had enough of war, it is us, the ones who have been waging war. There is no synchronized action of that kind at all.

[Milosavljevic] Part of the opposition feels betrayed. They are disappointed that you interrupted a very important debate about information and RTS, as though you were striving to have the Assembly dissolved.

[Nikolic] Why would we try to have the Assembly dissolved!? That would then mean that when Slobodan Milosevic signs any treasonous plan there will be no one to issue a warning to him before the citizens of Serbia. The Assembly is the only place where we can point publicly to Slobodan Milosevic's betrayal. If it were dissolved, we would have no platform from which to address the people. As far as we are concerned, we would like the Assembly to be in permanent session.

[Milosavljevic] There are still people who think you have some "deal" with the Socialists, and that you are still working together. How would you dissuade them?

[Nikolic] Well, you tell them that I am all black and blue, although the bruises are slowly going away because I am healing. I even have them in back, I have them even in places I cannot show you. Some "deal" when they beat you, when they beat you up.... You see, this is a specific case of intimidation. When a deputy is beaten up in the Assembly, then they are no longer confident of being safe on the street either. Then their families are not safe. And then things begin to break up in the family as well.

[Milosavljevic] Have they threatened members of your family?

[Nikolic] I do not know how it is with the others, I have been receiving constant anonymous threats. I am not accusing anyone of that, but I do not believe this is being done by my fellow citizens. I know that if the government makes a serious decision to eliminate someone, there is nothing that can save him. It is quite clear from the murders taking place in Belgrade that the victims were people who got rich last year thanks to cooperation with the authorities. Thus, I have no chance of staying alive if they decide to kill me.

[Milosavljevic] Are you afraid?

[Nikolic] No. I have done everything in this life. I am so tired that it sometimes seems to me that if they eliminated me I would first celebrate, and then I would rest. I am not afraid of that.

[Milosavljevic] Are you satisfied with your position in the party?

[Nikolic] We are the only party in which the president has allowed anyone else to attain complete equality with him. My actions differ from the actions of Vojislav Seselj. What he says carries greater weight and is stronger, it is backed up with more arguments, and I try to disarm my adversary with mildness in speech and harshness in action. The SRS is the only party which in the election campaign printed just as many posters with my picture as with the picture of Vojislav Seselj. That is what keeps me going, along with the truly unshakable nationality policy of Vojislav Seselj, in which there are no deviations, in which there are no curves. When from

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the speaker's platform in the Assembly I accused the Socialists of treason, I also said this: If Vojislav Seselj were to accept the peace plan for Bosnia, I am referring to the one that is now current, the SRS would also take up the question of whether Vojislav Seselj can be its president at all. And I say that in all seriousness. We do not have any idolatry, although we are at all extremely pleased with the party's president. That is what keeps us going, that belief in his strength and in the correctness of his decisions.

[Milosavljevic] More and more frequently, however, we are hearing from those who would prefer to see you as president of the party, which they explain in terms of Seselj's exaggeration, his immoderate public statements.

[Nikolic] No, that is not true. Stories like that are being spread by the Socialists, that the SRS would become a real party if I were its president. That is absolutely untrue. Without Vojislav Seselj, this party could not have this kind of clear physiognomy and could not have the kind of loyal committees it has throughout Serbia and in all the Serbian lands.

[Milosavljevic] Does it not seem to you that his last public statement might be counterproductive? At the moment, it seems he is not aware of the consequences of his acts.

[Nikolic] All of that is true except the bit about Vojislav Seselj not being conscious of the consequences of his acts. He plans everything he does. I was in fact looking for a man who, if we elected him, would know how to command everyone, including me. The point is that we want to see the policy advocated by Vojislav Seselj implemented. However, we have never had a meeting in which we kept silent. We always present our views, but the strength of the arguments which Seselj presents is such that sooner or later we all realize that he is right.

[Milosavljevic] Many people nevertheless are afraid of possible revanchism of the Radicals should they come to power. What basis is there for that fear?

[Nikolic] When Serbia is a completely democratic country, the statements made by Vojislav Seselj and me will no longer be so rough toward the authorities. The citizens of Serbia, the Radicals in particular, must realize that a dictatorship is not brought down by turning the other cheek to someone who is destroying you. This is a time for real radicals, for people like those who raised the Timok Rebellion.

[Milosavljevic] You have met Milosevic on several occasions. What impression did he leave on you?

[Nikolic] The first meeting with Slobodan Milosevic has been engraved in my memory. I found him sitting in an immense room. He was smoking small cigars, each one seemed to have an ivory tip. He was drinking whiskey. Perhaps I am wrong, because I do not drink, but it seemed he was drinking it with eggs. I do not know whether it is drunk that way.... And he reminded me so much of Tito. It was as though I was talking to Tito. He gave the impression of a self-confident man in the sense of: "Here, this is where the line will be drawn between me and Tudjman." And I told him: "Your line is too far to the east, it should be pushed back west. Here is Ozren." I remember very well that on those sketches of his Ozren belonged to the other side. Then he changed the topic. At the moment, the people are saying more and more that Sloba does not know what he is doing and that his people are lying. They also said that of Tito, and now they are doing the same with Sloba. Take the law on abortion, for example. It was proposed by the Socialist government, it was adopted by the Socialist deputies, but the president of the Socialist Party sends it back and says: The law is inhumane. And then the people say: "You see, these Socialists are wrong, but Sloba is there to set them straight. And as long as Sloba is there, we will vote for the Socialists. It is true that they are no good, but we do like Sloba."

And now I tell them: Sloba is no good for you, Sloba has betrayed you, Sloba has stripped you naked and left you barefoot, Sloba has robbed you. So, if suicide is what you are after, then vote for him.

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